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ACCESS TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE:
AVOIDING THE A GURS PROBLEMS OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
DANIEL J. CAPRA*
INTRODUCTION
N the course of many criminal investigations, the state will uncover
information that is favorable to the criminal defendant. The likelihood
of defense counsel uncovering the same piece of information is usually
slim.1 This unequal access is caused by a number of factors ranging from
a differential in resources to the timing of investigations.2 The disparity
in access to exculpatory evidence is even greater when the defendant is
indigent.3
In Brady v. Maryland,4 the Supreme Court attempted to lessen the
disparity in access to exculpatory evidence before and during trial.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1974,
Rockhurst College; J.D. 1977, University of California, Berkeley.
1. See Rice, Criminal Defense Discovery: A Prelude to Justice or an Interlude for
Abuse?, 45 Miss. L.J. 887, 909-12 (1974). The defendant is generally at a distinct disad-
vantage because:
[T]he state's investigative facilities. . . invariably have been at work gathering
evidence long before defense counsel has entered the case. And in the process of
investigation, the state, unlike the defendant, has the right, upon a showing of
probable cause, to search private property for evidence. . . . It also has the
power to compel witnesses to appear before a grand jury to give sworn state-
ments which only the state can use in preparation for trial. The state can also
gain access to evidence which would not otherwise be available by granting
prospective witnesses immunity from prosecution.
Id. at 904 (footnotes omitted). See generally Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady?:
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 9 Crim. L. Bull. 325, 326 (1973) (discussing disparity in
defendant's and prosecution's resources); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 228, 249 (1964) (discussing respective advantages in discov-
ery of prosecutors and defendants); Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate
Police Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 835, 862-68 (1978) (pro-
posing sanctions on state for failure to investigate adequately all criminal cases) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Adequate Investigation]. Immunity from prosecution is more likely to be
granted to prosecution witnesses than to defense witnesses. See, eg., United States v.
Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 935-36 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 638-
41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
2. For instance, whereas the police can do fingerprint analysis and/or take blood
samples at the scene of the crime, defense counsel is unlikely to have been retained at this
point. The same would be true of finding and interviewing witnesses. See supra note 1.
3. See, eg., Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1984) (burden on
indigent defendant to show that psychiatric expert required for defense); Mason v. Ari-
zona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974) (burden on indigent defendant to show that
pre-trial investigative assistance required for defense), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975);
Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 812 (Miss. 1983) (burden on indigent defendant to
show that ballistics expert required for defense), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984).
4. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Brady and his companion, Boblit, were tried separately for felony mur-
der and sentenced to death.' Brady's pretrial request to inspect Boblit's
extrajudicial statements resulted in the prosecutor turning over some of
the material but withholding a statement in which Boblit confessed to
committing the homicide.' Brady testified and admitted his participation
in the crime but contended that it was Boblit who actually committed the
killing.7 In his summation, Brady's attorney conceded that Brady was
guilty of murder and asked the jury not to impose the death penalty.'
The jury, which had not heard Boblit's exculpatory statement, sentenced
Brady to death.9 When defense counsel later discovered the existence of
Boblit's statement, he moved for a new trial.10
The Supreme Court, obviously concerned that defense counsel was de-
nied access to evidence in the prosecutor's control, focused on the impact
of the nondisclosure on the defendant's ability to present his defense."'
Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecutor's motivation in sup-
pressing favorable evidence was irrelevant, given the overriding issue of
adequate access to evidence and the Constitution's guarantee of a fair
trial. 2 The Court stated that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 13
Brady was a major step forward in equalizing access to exculpatory
evidence. Before Brady, the Supreme Court had imposed an almost ab-
solute duty on the prosecutor to correct perjurious testimony. 14 In
Brady, however, the Court recognized that disclosure of evidence show-
ing perjury of government witnesses is not qualitatively different from
5. Id. at 84.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Brady moved for a new trial as to both guilt and punishment. The Maryland
Court of Appeals had granted a new trial as to punishment, see Brady v. State, 226 Md.
422, 430-31, 174 A.2d 167, 171-72 (1961), affd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the only issue in
the Supreme Court was whether a new trial as to guilt should have been granted as well,
see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 (1963).
11. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 86-89.
12. Id. at 87. See generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent
Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713, 841, 847-48 (1976) (dis-
cussing constitutional aspects of defendant's lack of access to relevant evidence); Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 121-23 (1974) (Brady is part of
guarantee of broad sixth amendment right to present effective defense).
13. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court's rejection of a prosecutorial mis-
conduct analysis is made manifest by the fact that the prosecutor in Brady had arguably
acted in bad faith. The prosecutor had disclosed other statements of Boblit, but sup-
pressed a statement favorable to Brady: Boblit's admission of the actual homicide. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1935).
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disclosure of exculpatory evidence in general.' 5 Disclosure is required in
both instances to ensure the defendant's access to favorable evidence.' 6
Furthermore, in neither situation is the willfulness of the prosecutor at
issue: The question is not prosecutorial misconduct, but rather the de-
fendant's constitutional right of access to favorable evidence. The irrele-
vance of prosecutorial misconduct, even in perjury cases, was made clear
in Giglio v. United States.Y" In Giglio, the prosecutor at trial did not
know that a witness lied in testifying that he had not received a promise
of leniency."8 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the claim that
the prosecutor's good faith prevented reversal of the conviction.' 9
The Court in Brady did not, however, constitutionalize criminal dis-
covery, nor did it intend to do so. For instance, Brady does not stand for
the proposition that the prosecutor must open his file to the defendant.2"
Of course, complete access to the prosecutor's file would help defense
counsel significantly.21 Counsel would be able to plan a strategy that
would enable it to dodge the prosecution's strong points and attack its
weak points. More cynically, however, the defendant would be able to
pressure witnesses before trial, or tailor his testimony in response to the
prosecution's case.' A further danger is that the defendant's unimpeded
access to the prosecutor's file may jeopardize continuing investigations.'
The crucial distinction between Brady and an open file rule is that
Brady requires disclosure only of evidence favorable to the defendant.24
15. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 86-87.
16. See Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1151 n.70 (1982); Westen, supra note 12, at 122;
Adequate Investigation, supra note 1, at 838-40.
17. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
18. See id. at 151-53 (another prosecutor, at an earlier stage of the case, had promised
the witness immunity).
19. See id. at 153-54.
20. This was made clear by the Court's statement in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,
795 (1972): "We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a
complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a
case." The Court overreacted in Moore, in that defendant was not asking for an open file.
Rather, defendant was merely asserting a Brady right to exculpatory evidence: the state-
ment of an important government witness that he had heard somebody bragging about
the crime of which Moore was accused. See id. at 805-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. Many commentators, including Justice Brennan, have argued for an open file pol-
icy. See, eg., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 279, 284-88, 293-95; Fahringer, supra note 1, at 335; Rice, supra note
1, at 912-13; Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 112, 136-40 (1972); Comment, Implementing Brady v. Maryland: An Argu-
mentfor a Pre-Trial Open File Policy, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 889, 904-12 (1974).
22. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). But see Brennan,
supra note 21, at 291 & n.40 (perjury "bogey man" evidences distrust of defense counsel
and is empirically unsupported).
23. See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 164 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
24. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Weatherford v. Bursey,
429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (defendant has no constitutional right to disclosure of unfavora-
ble evidence); United States ex rel. Knights v. Wolff, 713 F.2d 240, 244-46 (7th Cir.)
(need not disclose information that is not exculpatory), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 504
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Access to inculpatory evidence differs from access to exculpatory evi-
dence in its effect on the truth-seeking function. Knowledge of inculpa-
tory evidence would enable defense counsel to use strategic devices and
possibly even unfair practices to get his client acquitted. 25 In contrast,
defense counsel can use exculpatory evidence to present affirmative
favorable proof, helping to ensure the reliability of the verdict. Brady
thus enforces the right to a fair trial, not the right to an unfair advantage
for defense counsel. Further, Brady comports with the Utopian model of
a prosecutor's dual role: to be a zealous advocate but always to see that
justice is done.26
Unfortunately, although the spirit of Brady was expansive as to equal-
ity of access to exculpatory evidence, the effectuation of such access has
been problematic. The two major problems of implementing the Brady
right are that: the prosecutor-an understandably biased party-is left to
decide which information is in fact favorable to the defendant; and when
a defendant is denied access to exculpatory evidence, he must rely on a
speculative post-trial review to determine the effect such evidence would
have had on his case.
The first problem arises because Brady, by imposing an affirmative
duty on the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, apparently envi-
sions that it is the prosecutor's duty to comb his files, perhaps spurred by
a request from defense counsel,2 'and decide which evidence must be
turned over to the defendant. But, even though the prosecutor does have
a duty to see justice done 2s-from which a duty to turn over exculpatory
evidence would seem a natural outgrowth-he is also a zealous advocate.
Thus, if the prosecutor is to decide which evidence is favorable to the
(1983); People v. Perez, 100 A.D.2d 366, 374, 474 N.Y.S.2d 767, 771-72 (1984) (need not
disclose evidence that does not suggest innocence). Of course defendants may have non-
constitutional rights to disclosure of certain unfavorable evidence pursuant to the Jeneks
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, § 3500, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1982)) (statement of government witness available to defendant after witness has
testified), and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Fed. R. Crim. P. 16
(defendant's right to inspect his statements, criminal record and test results in possession
of government).
25. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972); United States v, Cadet,
727 F.2d 1453, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
26. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
27. Brady imposed on the prosecutor a duty of disclosure only upon defense counsel's
request. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). After Brady, many courts and
commentators downplayed the significance of a defense request. See, e.g., Giles v. Mary-
land, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("I see no reason to make the result
turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request. If the defense does not know of the
existence of the evidence, it may not be able to request its production. A murder trial-
indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a sporting event."); Traynor, supra note 1, at 230
("How does Tantalus particularize that which is out of his sight as well as his reach?").
But the Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1976), elevated the neces-
sity of defense counsel's particularized request to constitutional doctrine. See infra notes
40-43 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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defense, it is only natural for him to err on the side of nondisclosure.
Evidence that defense counsel may consider very favorable (or that can
lead to even more favorable evidence) is apt to be downplayed or over-
looked-and thus not disclosed-by an advocate on the other side.29
Like the police officer in the fourth amendment context, the prosecutor is
involved in a "competitive enterprise."' 30 But whereas the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement provides for an independent factfinder to
protect the citizen's rights,31 Brady seems to place the equally important
right of access to exculpatory evidence 2 in the hands of a biased party.33
Brady thus leaves the prosecutor with the nearly impossible task of deter-
mining objectively which evidence is favorable to the defendant.'
29. For example, the following anecdote was related by Jon 0. Newman, then United
States Attorney for Connecticut (now a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals),
to the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit:
I recently had occasion to discuss [disclosure under Brady] at a PLI Conference
in New York City before a large group of State prosecutors.... I put to
them this case: You are prosecuting a bank robbery. You have talked to two or
three of the tellers and one or two of the customers at the time of the robbery.
They have all taken a look at your defendant in a line-up, and they have said,
"This is the man." In the course of your investigation you also have found
another customer who was in the bank that day, who viewed the suspect, and
came back and said, "That is not the man."
The question I put to these prosecutors was, do you believe you should dis-
close to the defense the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect,
said "that is not the man"? In a room of prosecutors not quite as large as this
group but almost as large, only two hands went up.... Yet I was putting to
them what I thought was the easiest case-the clearest case for disclosure of
exculpatory information!
J. Newman, Remarks at the Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit (Sept. 8,
1967), reprinted in Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500-01 (1968) (emphasis
in original); see also Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off
the Prosecutor's Hands, 17 Idaho L. Rev. 237, 243 (1981) (prosecutor incapable of mak-
ing objective determination of favorability); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 749, 765 (1964) (same).
30. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[Fourth amendment's] protec-
tion consists in requiring that... inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.").
31. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
32. Both rights are fundamental constitutional rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (access to exculpatory evidence); Volf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949) (protection against unreasonable search and seizure), overruled on other grounds,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
33. This is not to speak of the abuse that can occur if the prosecutor acts in bad faith.
Even an independent fact-finder or an open file rule cannot guarantee pre-trial access to
exculpatory evidence if the prosecutor deliberately chooses to hide such evidence. This
Article contends, however, that the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant
occurs largely due to good faith conclusions of nonfavorability by a zealous adversary.
The prosecutor would turn over more evidence if he could look at his file the way an
independent factfinder would. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
34. Similar problems can be seen in the Court's implementation of rights against com-
pelled self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as in Brady, the
Court imposed on state officials a constitutional duty to protect the rights of an adversary
party by adopting an objective point of view, a task which is by definition impossible. See
1984]
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The second problem of implementing the Brady right arises once the
prosecutor has overlooked or downplayed evidence objectively favorable
to the defendant and the defendant has been tried without access to that
evidence. Assuming that the evidence is discovered by the defendant at a
later date,35 the question is whether the prosecutor has violated the de-
fendant's right to due process. The Court in Brady held that the defend-
ant was entitled to a new trial on due process grounds if the prosecutor
had suppressed "material" evidence,36 thus implying that a new trial is
not automatically required whenever the prosecutor suppresses exculpa-
tory evidence. The Court did not define when suppressed exculpatory
evidence would be deemed material, but the problem left by Brady is not
merely the definition of materiality.37 A more important problem is that,
whatever the standard of materiality, it is applied after the trial is over.
At that point it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the true effect
that the exculpatory evidence would have had on the defendant's case.
Would it have changed the defense counsel's strategy? Could it have
been easily deflected by the prosecution? If introduced as evidence,
would it have been believed by the jury?
Such a speculative inquiry is made necessary because of the prosecu-
tor's failure to turn over the evidence before or during trial. The flaw of
Brady is not in requiring that suppressed information be material or in
id. at 467 (police must adequately and effectively apprise accused of his rights and fully
honor his exercise thereof). For an alternative to Miranda, comparable to the proposals
in this Article as to the implementation of Brady, see Kauper, Judicial Examination of
the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1224, 1239-55 (1932).
35. This is a big assumption in many cases. Defense counsel rarely continues an in-
vestigation after trial. Undoubtedly, much evidence in the prosecutor's control is never
discovered by defendant. See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3rd Cir.
1984) ("Only if the defendant is the beneficiary of fortuitous happenstance by discovering
the materials through extrajudicial means. . . are his rights vindicated. The 'game' will
go on, but justice will suffer."); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3rd Cir.
1984) ("[W]e are left with the nagging concern that [because of prosecutional bias in
determining favorability of evidence] material to the defense may never emerge from se-
cret government files."). For a bizarre case of discovery by defense counsel, see Chavis v.
North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 1980) (defense counsel discovers favorable
treatment of star prosecution witness, supposedly imprisoned, when witness waves to de-
fense counsel from balcony of beach motel).
36. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
37. The circuit courts after Brady and before Agurs took various approaches to deter-
mining the materiality of suppressed evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d
736, 744 (10th Cir. 1974) (even when suppressed evidence would be admissible only to
attack witness' credibility, "prosecution's failure to produce must be inherently signifi-
cant and favorable to the defense"); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir.
1972) ("undisclosed evidence may be 'material' on the issue of an accused's guilt or inno-
cence even though it goes only to credibility"); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290-
91 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (defendant would be granted new trial if "government failed to dis-
close evidence which, in the context of this case, might have led jury to entertain a rea-
sonable doubt about [defendant's] guilt"). For full a discussion of materiality standards
adopted by the lower courts before United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), see Com-
ment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining The Prosecutor's Duty of Disclo-
sure, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 433 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Defense Requests].
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leaving the explication of such a standard to another day. Rather, the
flaw of Brady is in allowing the prosecutor to determine initially whether
evidence should be turned over. By failing to provide for an objective
determination of favorability before or during trial, the Court in Brady
made necessary a speculative post-trial review. The question-"what
would have happened?"-would not arise if the Court had invoked a
more reliable device for ensuring disclosure in the first place.38
In the years since Brady, the problems of inadequate pre-trial review of
exculpatory evidence and speculative post-trial review of the effect of
nondisclosure have been exacerbated. In United States Y. Agurs, 9 the
Court tacitly recognized the difficult position of the prosecutor after
Brady: Because of his role as an advocate, the prosecutor cannot deter-
mine the favorability of evidence in the way that an independent
factfinder (not to speak of defense counsel) would." However, the Court
chose a strange solution for the prosecutor's dilemma: It shifted to de-
fense counsel the burden of determining which evidence is exculpatory.
In other words, under Agurs it is defense counsel's obligation to put the
prosecutor on notice that certain evidence is or could be exculpatory. 4
Thus, directed by defense counsel, the prosecutor supposedly can act
more objectively. The problem with this solution is that in many if not
most cases, defense counsel is given the virtually impossible task of spe-
cifically identifying evidence that by definition he does not know exists.42
Defense counsel must in effect rummage through the prosecutor's file
without having access to the file.43
It is the contention of this Article that the spirit of Brady, based as it is
on equality of access to exculpatory evidence before and during trial,
cannot be effectuated by putting the pre-trial burden of determining
favorability on the prosecutor. Nor can such access be guaranteed by
foisting the burden of notice on defense counsel. A better way to ensure
access to exculpatory evidence while it can still benefit defendant is to put
the burden of determining the favorability of evidence on an independ-
ent, objective fact-finder: the trial court. This Article advocates a pre-
trial in camera review by the court of all information in the prosecutor's
38. See infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
39. 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
40. Id. at 110-11.
41. See id. at 106-07.
42. See supra note 27.
43. Anyone who has played the game of Clue knows the frustration of such a search.
The players in Clue must guess which cards are concealed in a pouch through a series of
guesses and deductions by which the player eliminates alternatives. Unfortunately, the
stakes for defense counsel in the "Agurs Game" are higher than those for the Clue player.
It is ironic that the Court in Agurs ridiculed the "sporting theory of justice," United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-09 & n.15 (1976), yet elevated guesswork by defense
counsel to a constitutional standard, see id. at 114; see also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (requiring request from defense counsel turns trial
into a sporting event); Babcock, supra note 16, at 1152 (using metaphor of officiated game
to discuss Agurs).
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custody. An in camera hearing requirement would remove from both
the prosecutor and defense counsel the burden of determining
favorability of evidence. It would avoid the dreaded "open file rule.""
Most importantly, by providing for more reliable disclosure, an in cam-
era hearing requirement could substantially relieve the courts of retro-
spective reviews of "what might have been," and the inevitable threat to
the finality of judgments that such reviews entail.45
Part I of this Article examines the effectuation of the Brady right by
Agurs, and lower court decisions after Agurs. It is apparent from a read-
ing of these cases that the right of access to exculpatory evidence cannot
be fully guaranteed by biased determinations of favorability. Such an ap-
proach leads to haphazard post-trial discovery and retrospective review
under sliding standards of materiality. Part II of this Article discusses
the current limited use of in camera hearings in the Brady context. Part
II then outlines a proposal for an in camera hearing requirement in all
criminal cases, and discusses both the benefits and problems that such a
requirement would cause.
I. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: AGURS AND ITS PROGENY
A. Why Put the Burden of Notice on Defense Counsel?
In Agurs, the defendant was charged with the stabbing death of James
Sewell.46 Agurs admitted the killing and pleaded self-defense.47 Defense
counsel presented no evidence;48 the self-defense claim was presented
solely through argument and through cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's witnesses.49 Defense counsel did not request that the prosecutor
disclose Sewell's criminal record,5" perhaps because he did not think it
would be admissible to show the victim's character. 5' Agurs was found
44. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 795 (1972).
45. Retrospective review cannot be totally eliminated, however, even by an in camera
hearing requirement. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). Defendant Linda Agurs, a
small woman, checked into a motel with James Sewell, who was wearing a Bowie knife
and carrying another knife in his pocket. Id. at 99. About fifteen minutes later three
motel employees heard Agurs screaming. Id. They found Sewell on top of Agurs as both
struggled for a knife. Id. Sewell later died of multiple stab wounds resulting from this
struggle; Agurs was unharmed. Id. at 99-100. Sewell was found with no money on his
body, but his wife testified that he had $360 in his possession a few hours before the
killing. Id. at 99.
47. See id. at 100.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 101.
51. Many courts have held that a defendant has a constitutional right of access only
as to admissible evidence. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty of Disclos[ure]: From
Brady to Agurs and Beyond, 69 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 197, 209-11 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Duty of Disclosure]. This is an anomalous result because Brady guarantees
access to favorable evidence either before or during trial, see infra notes 278-87 and ac-
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guilty.52 After the trial, defense counsel came across a case that dis-
cussed the admissibility of a victim's prior criminal record when self-
defense is claimed.53 He went to the United States Attorney's office and
found, near the front of the prosecutor's file, Sewell's criminal record
showing prior convictions for violent crimes."
Sewell's violent past, about which the jury did not know, would obvi-
ously have been helpful to Agurs' claim of self-defense." Accordingly,
defense counsel moved for a new trial, arguing that the prosecutor had
denied the defendant her constitutional right, guaranteed by Brady, of
access to favorable evidence.56 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit granted a new trial, holding that the undisclosed evi-
dence was material because it might have affected the jury's verdict.57
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the Court of Appeals
applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether the evidence
was material and thus subject to disclosure under Brady.18 The Supreme
Court specifically stated that "[tihe proper standard of materiality must
reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt."5 9
Although the Court's expressed concern in implementing Brady is
with the factual guilt of the accused,6" Agurs is a confusing case because
companying text, when it is difficult if not impossible to tell whether evidence is admissi-
ble or not. At any rate, allowing the prosecutor to determine admissibility again indicates
the central flaw of Brady: the lack of an objective determination of disclose ability at the
time that disclosure should occur.
Furthermore, even if information could reliably be determined to be inadmissible, dis-
closure should not be absolutely precluded. Inadmissible information can often lead to
favorable evidence that is admissible. See United States v. Bonanno, 430 F.2d 1060, 1062
(2d Cir. 1970) (prosecution required to disclose existence of outstanding indictment
against principal prosecution witness because it gives lead to defense to investigate possi-
ble governmental promises to witness), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970); United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (names of witnesses are not admissi-
ble evidence but disclosure may be required when such names could lead to favorable
admissible evidence); Duty of Disclosure, supra, at 283-84 (prosecutor has duty "to dis-
close exculpatory material which might not be evidentiary itself but which might provide
leads to other evidence") (quoting United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.RD. 186, 193 (M.D.
Pa. 1971)).
52. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 98.
53. See United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Defense counsel cited United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432,
434 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d at 1251; see Babcock, supra note 16, at 1172.
55. See Bowman & Bowman, Defense of a Homicide Case, in 3 Criminal Defense
Techniques §§ 50.01[4], 50.03[2] (1984).
56. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d at 1251.
57. See id. at 1254.
58. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102, 112-14 (1976).
59. Id. at 112.
60. See id. at 112-13. The Burger Court's concern with an accurate factual determi-
nation of guilt, as opposed to the adequacy of legal process by which such a determina-
tion is made, has been noted by several commentators. See, e.g., Chase, The Burger Court,
the Individual, and the Criminal Process. Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 518, 519 (1977); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L Rev. 436, 437 (1980); Ade-
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this expressed concern is different from the Court's actual concern and
consequent result. If the Court were concerned solely with Brady's im-
pact on the correctness of the verdict, one would expect a suppressed
piece of evidence to be evaluated by a single standard of materiality:
Either the evidence would impeach the verdict or it would not. Yet
Agurs established three different standards of materiality by which a
court is to determine retrospectively the effect that an undisclosed piece
of evidence might have had on the verdict. The actions of the prosecutor
and the defense counsel determine which materiality standard is to be
applied.
Under Agurs, if the undisclosed evidence shows that a prosecution wit-
ness committed perjury, then such evidence is considered material "if
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury."61 If the undisclosed evidence does not
indicate perjury, the standard of materiality depends on whether the de-
fense counsel makes a specific request for the information.62 If the de-
fense counsel makes such a request, 63 reversal is required if the
undisclosed evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial."'
The Court apparently intended that this standard of materiality be rela-
quate Investigation, supra note 1, at 850-52. The result in Agurs, however, does not follow
the model of factual guilt, because, as will be discussed, see infra notes 68-70 and accom-
panying text, the same undisclosed fact is treated differently depending on defense coun-
sel's request.
61. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Court explained this "pro-
defense" standard, see Babcock, supra note 16, at 1148 n.52, on the ground that perjury
corrupts "the truth-seeking function of the trial process," Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. Yet
this explanation is inadequate, because undisclosed evidence showing perjury is not quali-
tatively different from undisclosed favorable evidence in general. See id. at 116 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Moreover, as will be discussed below, see infra notes 151-55, the
line between "perjury" and "inconsistency" is quite nebulous, particularly with respect to
its effect on the jury. Furthermore, the Court's special treatment of perjury ignores the
Court's melding of undisclosed perjury and undisclosed favorable evidence in general in
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972), and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,
216 (1942). See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
62. This is not to say that the defense counsel's activity is irrelevant in a perjury
situation. To the contrary: Whether a witness has committed perjury, instead of merely
stating an "inconsistency," will depend on the thoroughness of the defense counsel's
cross-examination. As with the obligation to make a specific request, defense counsel's
obligation to pin down perjurious testimony requires defense counsel to stab in the dark.
This can be an extremely perilous adventure on cross-examination. See Carey v. Duck-
worth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984) (testimony of prosecution witness held to be
"misleading," but not perjurious: "While Shields might have been more forthcoming in
his testimony, neither can he be charged with defense counsel's failure to ask penetrating
questions on cross examination.").
63. The Court in Agurs did not define when a request would be deemed specific. The
Court merely stated that the request in Brady was a paradigmatic example of a specific
request in that "[i]t gave the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired."
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Lower courts after Agurs have had
considerable difficulty in determining whether a defense request is specific or general. See
infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Most courts have held this stan-
dard to be equivalent to the "harmless error" standard. See, e.g., United States v.
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tively easy for defendant to meet.65 Finally, where the defense counsel
makes a general request or no request, the undisclosed evidence will be
material under Agurs only when it "creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist."66 This standard is "pro-prosecution," '67 because it
is much harder for a defendant to meet than the standard applied if a
specific request has been made.
A cursory look at these various standards shows without doubt that
the Agurs Court had other things on its mind than the avowed intent to
guarantee reliable verdicts.6" For instance, the same piece of undisclosed
evidence, which would obviously have a single effect on a jury's verdict,
will mandate different treatment under Agurs depending on the defense
counsel's activity.69 A perfect example is the undisclosed evidence in
Agurs. Evidence of Sewell's violent past would undoubtedly have had
some effect on the jury, as the Court of Appeals held, but reversal was
not required because defense counsel did not specifically request the evi-
dence.7° The rule in Agurs is thus fundamentally inconsistent with a sole
focus on a reliable verdict.
If the Court was not solely concerned with a reliable verdict, what
could it have had in mind by such a complicated implementation of the
Brady right? One motivation underlying Agurs must have been to allo-
cate some of the burden in the disclosure process to defense counsel. De-
fense counsel's efforts after Agurs are a critical factor in determining the
extent of defendant's right of access to exculpatory evidence. Why did
the Court impose this burden on defense counsel? Professor Babcock
contends that the Agurs Court sought to stem the broader implications of
Brady that could have led to the abandonment of an adversarial system
of justice.71 She posits that because Brady requires the prosecutor to aid
his adversary, the intent of Agurs is to require the adversary to earn such
aid.72
This backlash toward a more adversarial system, however, does not
Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973 (1979); Babcock,
supra note 16, at 1147.
65. The Court stated that nondisclosure in a specific request situation would be "sel-
dom, if ever, excusable." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This language,
by focusing on excusing the prosecutor, again belies the Court's stated reliance on factual
guilt.
66. Id. at 112.
67. Professor Babcock cogently suggests the terms "pro-prosecution" and "pro-de-
fense" to characterize the differing standards of materiality delineated by Agurs. See Bab-
cock, supra note 16, at 1148 n.52.
68. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
69. See, eg., Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 189-91 (8th Cir. 1980) (evidence deemed
material because specifically requested, but court implied that reversal would not have
been required if general request had been made).
70. As Professor Babcock states: "[Tihe dross of Sewell's conviction record would
have been transformed by a specific request into reversal-worthy gold." Babcock, supra
note 16, at 1149.
71. See id. at 1145-55.
72. See id. at 1152.
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fully explain the standards set forth in Agurs. In certain situations after
Agurs, for instance, even though defense counsel does not satisfy his ad-
versarial burden, the prosecutor is nonetheless obligated to turn over ex-
culpatory evidence.73  Furthermore, the rules of the game in the
adversary model are not so harsh and unfair as to penalize a litigant with
a burden that will often prove impossible to fulfill.74 Yet Agurs does ex-
actly that by requiring defense counsel specifically to request information
without knowledge of its existence."
Finally, if Agurs is based on the Supreme Court's desire to restore the
adversary system, one would expect the result of defense counsel's satis-
fying his adversarial burden to be congruent with the standard of preju-
dice for defense counsel's failure to satisfy such a burden. Yet this is not
the case. If defense counsel makes a specific request and the prosecutor
fails to disclose the requested evidence, the conviction is reversed only if
the suppressed evidence "might have affected the outcome."76 Yet when
the same evidence goes unrequested due to ineffective assistance of de-
fense counsel,7 7 reversal is not required unless the outcome "would have"
73. See, e.g., Anderson v. South Carolina, 709 F.2d 887, 888 (4th Cir. 1983) (general
request for exculpatory police reports held material under pro-prosecution standards of
Agurs); Carman v. State, 604 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Alaska 1979) (failure to disclose exculpa-
tory material that would have created reasonable doubt justifies new trial under Agurs; no
specific request by defense counsel).
74. See Fuller, The Adversary System, in Talks on American Law 30, 42 (H. Berman
ed. 1961).
75. Some post-Agurs courts have gone so far as to castigate defense counsel for failure
to make the proper guesses on a specific request. For instance, in Ruiz v. Cady, 710 F.2d
1214 (7th Cir. 1983), the court stated:
In the course of representing a defendant, it is incumbent upon defense counsel
to make specific requests for specific, allegedly exculpatory evidence in the pos-
session of the prosecution, and it is not the responsibility of the prosecutor or
the judge to do the work of the defense counsel. All too often, as we are seeing
in this case, the defense counsel makes a buckshot approach hoping a pellet will
strike-this type of lack of preparation is not in the best interest of his client nor
is it in the interest of justice.
Id. at 1218. It is submitted that such a "buckshot approach" does not always, or even
often, stem from a "lack of preparation." Rather, defense counsel's broad discovery re-
quests are caused by his impossible situation after Agurs: How can he ask for specific
evidence without being able to look at the prosecutor's file? See supra notes 29, 30 and
accompanying text. It is this unwarranted burden that Agurs imposes on defense counsel
that the Ruiz court should have labeled as "not in the interest of [defendant] nor. . . in
the interest of justice." Ruiz, 710 F.2d at 1218.
76. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
77. Even though Agurs does leave defense counsel with an impossible task in many
cases, there will of course be certain situations in which a reasonably competent defense
counsel will be able to make a very specific request. Professor Babcock cites the factual
situation in Agurs as a case of ineffective assistance, in that a professionally competent
attorney would have requested Sewell's record of prior convictions. See Babcock, supra
note 16, at 1172-73. In such a case, defense counsel's failure to comply with the Agurs
burden would be grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984) (counsel has duty to make reasonable
investigations).
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been affected.7" Thus it appears that the duty imposed by Agurs on de-
fense counsel is higher than the duty imposed on the justice system to
order a new trial when defense counsel fails to fufill his adversarial bur-
den under Agurs. A true commitment to the adversary system would
require reversal whenever defense counsel unreasonably failed to request
specifically evidence that might have (as opposed to would have) affected
the outcome.79
If the Court was not solely motivated by the adversary theory in
Agurs, why did the Court impose on defense counsel the burden of mak-
ing a specific request? The case, particularly the discussion of the prose-
cutor's role after Brady, 0 indicates that the Court was especially
concerned with the difficult if not impossible task imposed on the prose-
cutor by Brady. The prosecutor, a zealous advocate by trade, could not
easily be expected to comb through his files and determine with precision
all evidence that will help his adversary's case in the slightest. Without
any aid from those with a more objective viewpoint, the most that could
be expected from a prosecutor is that he will view as favorable only those
items of evidence that are obviously exculpatory to defendant, such as
evidence that creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.8" The
Agurs Court recognized, however, that the Brady right of access to excul-
patory evidence could not be fully implemented if the defendant were
entitled only to such obviously exculpatory evidence as would create a
reasonable doubt.82 Brady simply stated that defendants were entitled to
favorable material evidence. 3 The Court in Agurs recognized that Brady
did not require that evidence had to shake the courtroom (or jury room)
walls in order to be material.8 4 In Brady itself, the suppressed evidence
held to be material to punishment 5 was of course favorable, but it hardly
78. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct 2052, 2068 (1984).
79. As Professor Babcock suggests, the only way to form a proper connection be-
tween the specific request requirement and the effectiveness of counsel is through an espe-
cially pro-defendant standard of materiality for effective assistance: "Ideally, if the
adversary model is to be fulfilled, no showing of prejudice should be required when the
defense lawyer has been shown to be seriously ineffective." Babcock, supra note 16, at
1167 (emphasis in original).
80. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-11 (1976).
81. See id. at 107. A reading of post-Agurs cases shows that even this mild assump-
tion may have been too much. Prosecutors have on occasion overlooked the favorability
of evidence that seems highly exculpatory. See, e.g., Austin v. McKaskle, 724 F.2d 1153,
1156 (5th Cir. 1984) (police reports directly contradict damaging testimony that defend-
ant was driver rather than passenger of car).
82. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Such a limited right would
give little recognition to the artistry of defense counsel in exploiting evidence that is even
remotely favorable. See id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (materiality should be deter-
mined by impact of evidence on jury); United States v. Bonanno, 430 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d
Cir.) (even if indictment against star government witness is inadmissible, "this would not
diminish its obvious value to the defense in preparing for trial"), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
964 (1970).
83. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
84. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976).
85. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
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determined the issue. Boblit's confession exculpating Brady would,
under the circumstances, be the subject of some skepticism by the jury. 6
The question for the Agurs Court was how to guarantee disclosure of
all evidence that is favorable but less than overwhelming-to which
Brady guarantees defendant's access-when such evidence would often
in good faith be overlooked by a prosecutor not prone to see the
favorability of any evidence to his adversary. The Court solved its di-
lemma by putting on defense counsel the burden of making a specific
request."7 This was done not solely to guarantee that the defendant earn
his Brady rights in the context of the adversary system, but rather be-
cause the Court apparently thought that defense counsel was the best
party to direct the prosecutor toward favorable evidence.88 Under Agurs,
the function of a defense request is to "flag" evidence that is favorable
but not overwhelming-evidence that a prosecutor in good faith would
probably overlook. 9 The reward for guiding the prosecutor in this man-
ner is disclosure, or reversal of a conviction when the prosecutor sup-
presses the evidence. The penalty for failing to guide the prosecutor
toward evidence that is favorable but less than overwhelming is the inevi-
table suppression of such evidence without reversal. The prosecutor is
not expected to determine the favorability of such evidence on his own.
Accordingly, such less-than-overwhelming evidence that would not cre-
ate a reasonable doubt but merely "might have affected the verdict," can-
not, under Agurs, create a right to reversal unless the defense counsel
flags it for the prosecutor. 90
In sum, Agurs effectuates the Brady right of disclosure by trying to
take much of the heat off the prosecutor. This is a salutory goal, even
though incompletely realized, given the prosecutor's singular incapability
of determining whether evidence is favorable to his adversary. However,
Agurs in turn puts the heat on the defense counsel to effectuate Brady
rights. This, as we will see, is not a salutory goal, and results in an inef-
fective remedy for the fundamental right of access guaranteed by Brady.
86. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), less-than-overwhelming evidence
was also held to be material under Brady principles. See id. at 154. The suppressed
evidence indicated that the main prosecution witness had made a deal with the govern-
ment. This evidence was of course favorable to the defendant, but the defendant had
already cross-examined the witness vigorously. See id. at 151-52. The Court reversed
Giglio's conviction on the grounds that the jury was entitled to know of this evidence
because it affected the witness' credibility. Id. at 154-55.
87. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("In Brady the request was
specific. It gave the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired.").
89. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1968); Defense Re-
quests, supra note 37, at 448-51.
90. See United States v. Turner, 725 F.2d 1154, 1159 (8th Cir. 1984) (favorable evi-
dence might have affected verdict, but does not create reasonable doubt; no reversal in
absence of specific request); Maddox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (1Ith Cir.
1983) (no specific request for evidence; therefore no reversal). See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
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B. Agurs-a Defective System for Guaranteeing Access to Exculpatory
Evidence
There are five basic problems with the method chosen by the Court in
Agurs to determine the favorability of evidence to an accused. Part I of
this Article proposes an in camera hearing requirement for all criminal
cases, which would overcome the problems created by Agurs' implemen-
tation of the Brady right.
1. Prosecutor's Bias
The first problem arises because even if the evidence is extremely
favorable and important to the defense as an objective matter, it is not
uncommon for the zealous prosecutor to overlook its favorability in good
faith. Thus, as with Brady,"1 Agurs' assumption that even the prosecutor
can determine the favorability of obviously exculpatory evidence takes
insufficient account of the prosecutor's dilemma. For example, in Can-
non v. Alabama,92 the issue of Cannon's identity as the perpetrator of a
murder was in dispute.93 The prosecution had one eyewitness to the
crime who identified Cannon.94 The prosecutor failed to disclose, how-
ever, that another person at the scene just before the murder occurred
had stated that Cannon was not there.9" As an advocate, it was certainly
possible for the prosecutor to convince himself in good faith that the
undisclosed evidence was not that important. The undisclosed witness
did not say that another person had in fact committed the crime; she
merely said that she hadn't seen Cannon at the scene that night.9" This
did not foreclose the possibility that Cannon arrived after she left.
Therefore, even assuming that the prosecutor would evaluate in detail
the import of evidence in his file not affirmatively favorable to his own
case, it is understandable if he does not, as an objective matter, see that
such evidence is favorable to the defendant's case.97 The Fifth Circuit in
Cannon, however, held that the witness' undisclosed statement to a po-
lice officer that she had not seen Cannon, was material under Agurs even
though defense counsel had made no request for the evidence. 98 Thus,
the court found that this evidence was so highly exculpatory that even
the zealous advocate should have seen its favorability to the defense.
Yet, the facts of Cannon itself show that the burden on prosecutors to
cast an objective eye on their files is too great, even regarding highly
91. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
92. 558 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
93. See id. at 1213.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. It should be remembered that the prosecutor, who has already obtained an indict-
ment, obviously feels that his case is strong-strong enough, perhaps, to withstand any
evidence from which a defense counsel can wring a drop of favorability.
98. See Cannon v. Alabama, 558 F.2d at 1215-16.
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exculpatory evidence.99 This burden could be alleviated by requiring the
prosecutor to submit his entire file to the trial court for in camera review.
2. Marginally Favorable Evidence
Because a prosecutor is prone to overlook highly exculpatory evidence,
he will also overlook the favorability of less highly exculpatory evidence
that is specifically requested by defense counsel. That is, the fact that the
defense counsel, as required by Agurs, guides the prosecutor to favorable
evidence does not necessarily mean that such evidence will be disclosed.
The prosecutor still has an adversary mindset, and even when directed to
evidence, he cannot be expected to look at it with defense-colored or even
objective glasses. The Agurs system of guaranteeing disclosure of evi-
dence that is less than overwhelmingly favorable in fact fails to guarantee
such disclosure, because the ultimate question of favorability remains
with the understandably biased prosecutor.
An example of the failure of the Agurs notice system is Jones v.
Jago.1 o The defense counsel in Jones specifically directed the prosecutor
toward all statements made by one Harvey. 0 1 The prosecutor reviewed
Harvey's statements and unilaterally determined that none were
favorable to defendant Jones.'" 2 In fact, Harvey, an eyewitness to the
99. The burden on the prosecutor is exacerbated by the fact that under the Bradyl
Agurs system of retrospective review, materiality of suppressed evidence is determined in
light of all the evidence. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). For in-
stance, the suppressed statement in Cannon was considered material, partly due to the
weakness of the government's case. Yet prospectively, from the prosecutor's point of
view, it is all but impossible to expect him to recognize the weakness of his case, and then
to gauge the favorability of evidence to the accused accordingly. There is thus an imper-
fect fit between the prosecutor's duty to disclose and the enforcement of that duty
through retrospective application of materiality standards. This imperfect fit is recog-
nized, but not resolved, by the Court in Agurs. See 427 U.S. at 107-08. The only way to
guarantee disclosure of evidence under consistent standards of favorability is through
contemporaneous review in an in camera hearing. See infra notes 180-88, 203-50 and
accompanying text. The defendant will never be accorded fair access to favorable evi-
dence under Brady when the right to such access is in the hands of a prosecutor looking
forward or reviewed by an appellate court looking backward.
Cannon is not an isolated case of a court finding that suppressed evidence was so highly
exculpatory that the prosecutor could be expected to (but failed to) determine its
favorability without any help from defense counsel. See, e.g., Austin v. McKaskle, 724
F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1984) (police records from night of appellant's arrest); Ander-
son v. South Carolina, 709 F.2d 887, 888 (4th Cir. 1983) (police reports contradicting
government's theory).
100. 575 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
101. See id. at 1166. Harvey was never called as a prosecution witness, so his state-
ments were not otherwise available to defense counsel under the Jencks Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1982).
102. See Jones v. Jago, 575 F.2d at 1166. It should be noted that this determination
by the prosecutor had the collateral effect of keeping Harvey off the stand as a defense
witness. Defense counsel reasonably assumed after nondisclosure by the prosecutor that
Harvey had made prior statements harmful to Jones. Defense counsel concluded, there-
fore, that any value of Harvey's testimony would be outweighed by damaging impeach-
ment evidence, which did not in fact exist. See id. at 1167.
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murder with which Jones was charged, had made extensive statements
that made no reference to Jones at all. 13 From the prosecutor's point
of view, the evidence was at best neutral because Harvey did not ex-
pressly let Jones off the hook. Jones illustrates how, as in Cannon,°'4 one
with a prosecutorial mindset could in good faith look at the evidence in
issue and determine that it was not exculpatory. Moreover, the fact that
defense counsel, by specific request, "flagged" this statement for special
review would not at all change the biased adversary's judgment with re-
spect to its favorability. "Flagging" the issue for consideration does not
change the nature of the person making the consideration. The court in
Jones rightly held that Harvey's statement was material under the spe-
cific request standards of Agurs, "in light of all the attendant circum-
stances.''0' Yet Jones shows that the burden on the prosecutor to cast
an objective eye on his files is too great, even when the defense counsel
guides him through the files. 106 The prosecutor would not have to under-
take such a burden if he were required to submit his entire file to the trial
court for in camera review.
103. Id. at 1166.
104. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
105. Jones v. Jago, 575 F.2d at 1166-67. As was seen for general requests in Cannon,
see supra note 99, the burden on the prosecutor as to specific requests is exacerbated by
the fact that his actions will be reviewed retrospectively in light of all the evidence. Thus,
besides determining favorability, a prosecutor looking forward must plan for a court
looking backward by assessing objectively the strength of his case. Agurs requires the
prosecutor not only to be objective-a seeming impossibility-but also to master a crystal
ball approach to favorability.
106. Jones is by no means an isolated case of a court reversing a conviction after find-
ing that the prosecutor had overlooked the favorable nature of evidence, even though
directed to it by his helpmate, the defense counsel. See, eg., Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d
1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (specific request for information respecting payment of gov-
ernment witnesses), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984); Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186,
190-91 (8th Cir. 1980) (police investigations of another suspect of crime); Sennett v. Sher-
iff of Fairfax County, 608 F.2d 537, 537 (4th Cir. 1979) (specific request for identity of
two persons whose testimony might have discredited prosecution's identification wit-
nesses; government's case "far from overwhelming"); People v. Kitt, 86 A.D.2d 465, 466,
450 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (1982) (exculpatory lab report suppressed despite specific request:
"prosecution believed the evidence to be more inculpatory" than exculpatory).
A fundamental flaw in the Agurs system is that the prosecutor, in making his prospec-
tive determination of favorability, is apt to usurp the function of the jury. Often a prose-
cutor's conclusion that evidence is not exculpatory (even after investigating the evidence
pursuant to a specific defense request) is really a conclusion that the evidence is entitled
to little if any weight. Yet it is axiomatic that the weight of the evidence is ajury question.
See BaJlou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981); Fed. R. Evid. 104.
For an example of prosecutorial usurpation of the fact-finder's role, see Chaney v. Brown,
730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. CL 601 (1984). In Chaney, the prosecutor
suppressed a statement, made to the FBI, that placed the murder victim over 100 miles
from defendant on the day of the victim's death. Id. at 1348. The prosecutor determined
that this statement was not exculpatory because the witness, at the time of defense coun-
sel's specific request, was no longer certain of her identification of the victim. Id.
Although this uncertainty may have detracted from the weight of the prior statement, the
statement was certainly favorable to the defendant. The Agurs system thus allowed the
prosecutor understandably, but impermissibly, to suppress the statement based on his
own nonobjective conclusion that it was entitled to no weight.
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3. Defense Counsel as Guide
Even assuming that a prosecutor can objectively determine the
favorability of flagged evidence, the role of navigator through the prose-
cutor's file is an impossible task for defense counsel to fulfill. In effect
Agurs requires the blind to lead the blind on a quest to discover evidence
favorable to the accused. Even the court in Agurs recognized that "[i]n
many cases. . . exculpatory information in the possession of the prose-
cutor may be unknown to defense counsel."107 Given this recognized
shroud over defense counsel, the Court would have been wise to ques-
tion the advisability of designating defense counsel as the prosecutor's
navigator. Instead of searching for another method of providing for dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence, however, the Court determined that any
built-in deficiencies in defense counsel's ability to guide the prosecutor
would simply excuse the prosecutor from a duty to disclose exculpatory,
but not highly exculpatory, evidence. 108 The fact that defense counsel
could not possibly have known that certain evidence existed created no
sympathy for the defendant on the Court's part. Rather, the inherent
limitations of defense counsel as navigator give rise under Agurs to sym-
pathy for the prosecutor, who cannot be expected to uncover on his own,
evidence that is less than highly exculpatory." ° In sum, when defense
counsel cannot possibly guide the prosecutor to favorable evidence be-
cause there is no way he can know of it, suppression of such evidence is
not error under Agurs unless it is so obviously exculpatory as to create a
reasonable doubt.110 Defendant is thus denied access to less highly ex-
culpatory evidence that might have merely "affected" the verdict.II'
Denial of access to such evidence is clearly contrary to Brady's spirit of
disclosure.11 Access to all favorable evidence can best be ensured
through an in camera hearing requirement, which does not rely on de-
fense counsel as blind navigator.
107. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). See supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text.
108. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
109. A handful of courts have bent a little in recognizing the difficult situation facing
defense counsel and defendant after Agurs. For instance, some courts have held a rela-
tively general request to be specific when defense counsel could not be expected under the
circumstances to do any better. See, e.g., Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344 (10th
Cir.) ("Chaney's counsel could not limit his request to specific witnesses because the
request was made prior to trial and . . . counsel did not then know the[ir] identit[ies]
. .. ), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 601 (1984). Other courts have held that if there is doubt
whether a defense request is specific or general, the request should be deemed specific.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978).
In contrast, most courts are completely unsympathetic to defense counsel's inability spe-
cifically to request information to which he has never had access. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Cady,
710 F.2d 1214, 1218 (7th Cir. 1983). See infira notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
111. See supra note 27.
112. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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4. Materiality Standard for Reversal
Even assuming that defense counsel can in some situations point the
prosecutor toward favorable evidence, and even assuming that the prose-
cutor can overcome his bias and determine that such evidence is
favorable to the defendant, disclosure does not automatically follow.
Under Agurs, the prosecutor commits reversible error only by failing to
disclose materially favorable evidence. 113 Thus, favorable evidence that
is not, on retrospective review, deemed to be material can be freely sup-
pressed by the prosecutor. As the Agurs court stated: "The mere possi-
bility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not estab-
lish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." 1 4
The meaning and promise of Brady is that a defendant is entitled to
access to all evidence in his favor. 15 Yet this promise cannot be fully
effectuated by the system of retrospective review adopted in Brady and
perpetuated in Agurs. Of course, with the trial over and the verdict ren-
dered, the systemic costs would be too high if the defendant could obtain
a reversal whenever any objectively favorable evidence was suppressed.
A materiality standard is the Court's assurance that generally fair ver-
dicts are not unnecessarily overturned." 6 But although the Court's ad-
herence to materiality standards is understandable in light of the interests
at stake in post-trial reviews, the fact remains that defendants will often
be denied access to objectively favorable evidence, without recourse.1 17
113. See supra notes 57-58, 61-67 and accompanying text.
114. 427 U.S. at 109-10. The Court justified its holding that not all favorable evidence
must be disclosed by contending that a rule requiring disclosure of all favorable evidence
would lead to an open file rule: "If everything that might influence a jury must be dis-
closed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to
allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice." Id. at 109.
Contrary to the Court's assertions, a rule requiring disclosure of all favorable evidence
does not lead to the dreaded open file rule. For instance, the prosecutor would not have to
disclose inculpatory evidence or neutral or irrelevant facts. Such information may be
helpful to an accused, but it is not favorable in a Brady sense. If defendant had an abso-
lute right to all favorable evidence, he would not be entitled to peruse the entire file, but
he would have access to all evidence that could fairly be used to defend his innocence.
115. See Westen, supra note 12, at 121-23.
116. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. It is thus possible that a prosecutor in custody of evidence that is objectively
favorable but not overwhelmingly exculpatory may be wiling to gamble with suppres-
sion. Assuming that the evidence is ever discovered by defense counsel (whose post-trial
investigatory incentives are low), reversal is anything but automatic. See, e.g., United
States v. Farid, 733 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1984) (specific request; impeachment
evidence favorable but not material); King v. Ponte, 717 F.2d 635, 645 (1st Cir. 1983)
(grand jury testimony favorable, but not material); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d
1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1983) (specific request; impeachment evidence favorable but not
material); see also United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rubin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (materiality, not mere admissibility or rele-
vance is Agurs test for reversal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1980).
After repeated frustration with prosecutors who gambled with suppression in reliance
on the retrospective materiality standards of Agurs, the Third Circuit recently attempted
to limit such gamesmanship in United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1984). In
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The only way to guarantee access to all favorable evidence and yet avoid
the open file rule is to provide objective review of the prosecutor's file
before the verdict is rendered-before the cost of a final judgment re-
quires application of a materiality standard.
Furthermore, the Court's reliance in Agurs on materiality standards,
although understandable, is fundamentally in conflict with the automatic
right of reversal promulgated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska'18
and reaffirmed in United States v. Cronic.'19 In Davis, the Court held
Oxman, the prosecutor suppressed a grant of immunity to a relatively important (though,
in the eyes of the prosecutor, undoubtedly cumulative) prosecution witness. See id. at
1311. The defense had specifically requested such information. Id. at 1301. After con-
viction, the government argued that the suppressed information was not material under
Agurs, because, viewed in the light of all the evidence presented, impeachment of the
witness would not have affected the verdict. Id. at 1311. The court stated:
It seems clear that [the Agurs] tests have a tendency to encourage unilateral
decision-making by prosecutors with respect to disclosure. . . . [T]he root of
the problem is the prosecutor's tendency to adopt a retrospective view of mate-
riality. . . . Following their adversarial instincts, some prosecutors have deter-
mined unilaterally that evidence will not be material and, often in good faith,
have disclosed it neither to defense counsel nor to the court. . . . Our experi-
ence since Agurs suggests that [it] . . . pays too much deference to the federal
common law policy of discouraging discovery in criminal cases, and too little
regard to due process of law for defendants .
Id. at 1310-11. In an attempt to control prosecutorial discretion in light of retrospective
review, the Oxman court rejected the Agurs standard of materiality for specifically re-
quested evidence, at least as framed in terms of whether it might have affected the verdict.
The Third Circuit instead lifted a sentence from Agurs that materiality would be found
whenever, viewed prospectively, "a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists." Id.
at 1313 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Recognizing that this
standard may require disclosure of favorable information that would not in fact have
affected the verdict, the court adopted a second step to the analysis: Assuming the evi-
dence should have been disclosed, and thus constitutional error occurred, was the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1317.
Although the Oxman court is to be commended for its attempt to solve the Agurs
problem of prospective application of retrospective standards of review, its effort is defec-
tive for several reasons. First, as the dissent points out, the court misreads Agurs when it
attempts to provide a stricter standard of pre-trial disclosure than the standard applied to
retrospective review. Id. at 1321 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Agurs specifically states that
no prosecutorial error has occurred unless the right to fair trial is denied. See 427 U.S. at
108. If evidence that, when viewed prospectively, appears possibly material is in fact not
material when viewed retrospectively, the fair trial right has not been denied under Agurs.
Secondly, after much ado, the court of appeals nonetheless applies a harmless error
standard on retrospective review. Because the harmless error standard has often been
equated with the Agurs "might have affected the verdict" standard, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text, it is apparent that the Oxman court has not solved the problem that
it addresses. A gambling prosecutor will gamble on the retrospective harmless error stan-
dard in exactly the same way that he will gamble on the "might have affected the verdict"
standard.
Finally, the Oxman court, in focusing on the gambling prosecutor, misses the central
problem of Agurs: The prosecutor's adversarial instincts will prevent an objective deter-
mination of favorability, no matter how protective to the defendant the standard of pre-
trial disclosure may be. Suppression will therefore occur even if the court were to adopt
an "arguable basis for claiming materiality" standard for pre-trial disclosure.
118. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
119. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
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that denial of the right to effective cross-examination by a state rule of
privilege that excluded evidence of bias was serious constitutional error
that could not be cured by any showing of lack of prejudice.' 2 In
Cronic, the Court cited Davis approvingly as a situation in which the
surrounding circumstances-denial of effective cross-examination-ren-
dered it so unlikely that counsel could render meaningful assistance that
automatic reversal was required. 2 ' In other words, the Court has twice
stated flatly that denial of the right to effective cross-examination man-
dates reversal even if evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and even if full
cross-examination would not have affected the conviction. In contrast, if
a prosecutor suppresses evidence, leading to ineffective cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses, application of Agurs would mean that reversal
is far from automatic. Much would depend on whether the defendant's
request for the information was specific or general." 2 Even if the request
were specific, reversal would not be proper under Agurs if evidence of
guilt was overwhelming. 123
In sum, the Court has failed to integrate the Agurs line of cases with
the Davis line. The defendant, for no reason whatsoever, is far better off
under Davis, even though the prosecutor's suppression can create the
same harm: denial of cross-examination. Not surprisingly, the conflict
between Davis and Agurs has created confusion. In Bagley v.
Lumpkin, 24 the Ninth Circuit applied the Davis rule of automatic rever-
sal when the prosecutor suppressed impeachment evidence, and thus de-
nied effective cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses.'1 5 This
result is consistent with Davis but improper under Agurs because the dis-
trict court judge had found beyond a reasonable doubt that even effective
cross-examination would not have affected the verdict. 26 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in Bagley127 to resolve the obvious conflict
between Davis and Agurs. For the purposes of this Article, it is enough
to note that the anomaly addressed in Bagley would not arise in a system
that guaranteed disclosure before the verdict is rendered.
5. Retrospective Review
Perhaps the major problem perpetuated by Agurs is that the Brady
right of access to exculpatory evidence is enforced after trial by way of
120. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129, 131 (1968) (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966))).
121. See United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984).
122. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
124. 719 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
125. See id. at 1464.
126. See id. The court of appeals did not challenge the district court's finding on this
issue per se; rather, it held that the Davis rule of automatic reversal was based on the
fundamentality of the right to effective cross-examination, the denial of which could
never be harmless. See id. at 1464.
127. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
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retrospective review. Because of the materiality standard imposed at that
point,128 a reviewing court cannot merely determine whether suppressed
evidence is objectively favorable to defendant, but must also determine
whether the evidence would or might have had some effect on the out-
come of the trial. Yet such a determination is inherently speculative be-
cause one cannot tell with any certainty what effect the evidence would
have had, precisely because the evidence was not introduced. 129 The ap-
pellate court's review of "what might have been" is extremely difficult in
the context of an adversarial system. Evidence is not introduced in a
vacuum; rather, it is built upon. The absence of certain evidence may
thus affect the usefulness, and hence the use, of other evidence to which
defense counsel does have access. Indeed, the absence of a piece of evi-
dence may affect the entire trial strategy of defense counsel.' 30 Retro-
spective review of suppressed evidence, even if made in light of all the
evidence presented at trial, is likely if not certain to give insufficient con-
sideration to the strategic uses to which the suppressed evidence could
have been put.131 In this respect, review of the likely effect of suppressed
128. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1313 n.12 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the
"hazards of hypothesizing about the particular course of events that may have ensued at
trial had the prosecutor disclosed exculpatory evidence"). A parallel problem of specula-
tion is found in civil breach of contract actions, when plaintiff is required to prove lost
profits: what he would have made but for defendant's breach. The general rule in this
type of case is to resolve all doubts against the defendant, who was the cause of this
uncertainty. See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918,
926 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 323, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449, 457 (1977). Interestingly, a parallel act of grace is not generally accorded
to Brady defendants, even though the uncertainty as to the effect of the evidence was
caused by the prosecutor's suppression and the trial court's lack of an in camera proce-
dure. See, e.g., United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.) (burden of materiality
on defendant), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3516 (1984); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d
1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1983) (same).
130. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the De-
fendant, 74 Yale L.J. 136, 145 (1964) (real focus of Brady must be on the effect suppres-
sion had on defense counsel's ability to prepare for trial) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutor's
Duty].
131. For example, in Antone v. Strickland, 706 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1983), Judge
Kravitch argued in her concurrence that an exculpatory statement and witness were not
material because they "would have contradicted the other theories on which [the] appel-
lant had relied." Id. at 1546 (Kravitch, J., concurring). The real question, however, is
whether Antone would have relied on those "other theories" if defense counsel had
known the existence of the suppressed witness and statement. A more appropriate,
though atypical, view was expressed by the Eighth Circuit in Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d
186 (8th Cir. 1980). The court rejected the government's argument that suppressed evi-
dence was not material because it was contrary to defendant's trial strategy:
We reject this suggestion. For it amounts, in effect, to a claim that evidence
wrongfully suppressed by the prosecution in advance of trial can be considered
material only if it supports the particular defense strategy actually employed by
the defendant, a strategy which, of necessity, would have been selected without
the benefit of evidence the defendant was entitled to consider and use. ...
[W]e refuse to bind the defendant to a trial strategy selected in the partial
vacuum created by the state's wrongful suppression of material evidence.
Id. at 191 n.3. The admirable analysis in Niccum is, however, arguably contrary to the
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evidence is even more difficult and speculative than most other reviewing
tasks undertaken by appellate courts.1 32 In a typical case in which the
government claims harmless error, for instance, the evidence has actually
been introduced, and the trial has gone forth.133 Even from a cold rec-
ord, therefore, it is easier to ascertain the actual effect of introduced evi-
dence than to determine "what might have been" if suppressed evidence
had been disclosed to defense counsel.13 1
A further problem with retrospective review is that it allows the appel-
late court, on a cold record, to usurp the jury's role.1 35 It is the jury's
task to weigh the evidence. 36 The Agurs standards of materiality, how-
ever, require a finding by the judge that the evidence would have created
a reasonable doubt (as to general requests) or that it might have affected
the outcome (as to specifically requested evidence). 137 The supposedly
objective materiality standards of Agurs do not require the judge to eval-
uate the suppressed information from the point of view of the reasonable
juror who has been presented with the evidence by skilled counsel.1 38
standards of materiality set forth in Agurs, which focus on the actual effect the suppressed
evidence would have had on the jury, as opposed to the use to which the evidence could
have been put by competent counsel. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n.20
(1976).
132. It could be argued that retrospective review is made easier by Agur' refusal to
focus on the use that defense counsel could have made of the evidence. This argument
ignores the fact that Brady guarantees access to evidence before and during trial. Thus, an
honest retrospective review would have to take account of the use that could have been
made of the evidence, as well as its effect on the jury. See United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 116-17 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 130, at
136, 149-50.
133. See, eg., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969) (unconstitutional
introduction of co-defendants' confessions); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19
(1967) (prosecutorial comment on failure of accused to testify).
134. When defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court will
often be required, after Strickland, see supra note 78 and accompanying text, to deter-
mine what might have happened if defense counsel had acted competently. This is the
same type of speculative analysis that the Agurs Court requires: to assume the existence of
an occurrence that did not in fact occur. Far from giving validity to the Agurs system of
review, however, the decision in Strickland shows another instance of the Supreme
Court's failure to recognize the difficulty of appellate review in such a situation. See
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2075 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also Larsen v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1984) (hypothetical "might have
beens" held insufficient to show prejudice under Strickland).
135. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117-18 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. See supra note 106.
137. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Note, The United
States Court of Appeal: 1975-1976 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 65 Geo. LJ. 201,
322-29 (1976) (discussing contrast between Brady information and requirements imposed
by Jencks Act).
138. See supra notes 41-43, 61-67 and accompanying text. In contrast, the Second
Circuit standard of materiality before Agurs was whether the suppressed material, as de-
veloped and presented by skilled counsel, could have created a reasonable doubt in the
minds of enough jurors to have affected the verdict. See United States v. Morell, 524
F.2d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1975). See also the pre-Agurs cases collected by Justice Marshall,
dissenting in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 119 n.5 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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Accordingly, numerous post-Agurs cases dismiss the materiality of sup-
pressed evidence because the reviewing courts were not impressed with
the value of the evidence in light of the entire record. 139 Yet this ignores
the impact that the evidence might have had on an actual jury of layper-
sons.14" In sum, the Agurs standard of retrospective review gives inade-
quate consideration to what would have actually happened at the trial if
the prosecutor had met his constitutional duty of disclosure.
The final problem with retrospective review under Brady and Agurs is
that it is an insufficient guarantee of finality of judgments. Of course, the
major reason for a materiality standard (as opposed to the full effectua-
tion of Brady rights that a mere favorability standard would provide) is
to protect the finality of judgments."' Ironically, however, a reviewing
court considering the materiality of suppressed evidence must make a
complete review of the record, without the benefit of a "clearly errone-
ous" standard. A "clearly erroneous" standard cannot be applied in the
majority of cases precisely because the trial court does not review the
suppressed evidence before the judgment is rendered.'42 There is, there-
fore, no judicial ruling to which the clearly erroneous standard can be
applied. If the trial court had reviewed the prosecutor's file pursuant to
an in camera hearing before the judgment was rendered, a clearly errone-
139. See infra note 140.
140. For instance, a standard ruling of post-Agurs courts is that undisclosed impeach-
ment evidence as to a prosecution witness is not material, even if specifically requested,
when the witness was impeached on cross-examination anyway. See, e.g., United States v.
Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 439 (1st Cir. 1982) (no request; witness' bias shown by other
evidence), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985) (No. 84-784); United States
v. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1138, 1139 (8th Cir.) (specific request; favorable treatment of prose-
cution witnesses not material because they had been impeached with prior crimes), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982); United States v. Talavera, 668 F.2d 625, 631-32 (1st Cir.)
(no request; prior statement of witness that he was prepared to give false alibi to police is
not material because witness was already impeached as a paid informant), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 978 (1982); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence
of deal with prosecution not material because witness was already impeached as inmate at
state hospital, as LSD user, and with prior inconsistent statements), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1009 (1978). Of course, it is possible for evidence favorable to the defense to be cumula-
tive. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). Under the
materiality standards of Agurs, however, it is far too likely that a reviewing judge will
determine evidence to be "cumulative," without considering its impact on a jury of
laypersons. For example, in Skinner, the prosecution witness was impeached with evi-
dence other than his deal with the government. See 564 F.2d at 1387. Yet these other
grounds of impeachment may very well not have had the same impact as evidence that
the witness had "sold his soul" to the government. Again it appears that the objective
standard of materiality set forth in Agurs and applied in Skinner gives insufficient consid-
eration to the impact that the suppressed evidence would have had on an actual jury. See
generally Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to
Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 887 (1981) (suggesting means to enforce
needed disclosure).
141. See supra note 115-17 and accompanying text.
142. A "clearly erroneous" standard can only be applied to a judge's ruling. See gener-
ally Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L.
Rev. 635, 664 (1971) (noting substantial deference given to trial judge's rulings based on
facts and circumstances critical to record).
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ous standard could legitimately be applied, thus providing greater protec-
tion of the final judgment. 143  The integrity of final judgments is
obviously furthered if the lower court's ruling is made before the judg-
ment is rendered. This is especially true if the court finds after pre-trial
in camera review that the evidence must be disclosed under Brady. If the
court orders disclosure after an in camera hearing, there will be no attack
at all on the final judgment on Brady grounds. 1' Coupled with an abuse
of discretion standard when the trial court refuses to order disclosure, an
in camera procedure would be less disruptive to finality values than the
system of retrospective review promulgated by Agurs.145
C. Lower Court Problems in Administering the Agurs
Materiality Standards
After reading Agurs, one could not be called a doomsayer for predict-
ing that the lower courts would have considerable difficulty in applying
the standards set forth by the Court. Whether a court must reverse due
to prosecutorial suppression of favorable evidence is governed under
Agurs by a three-tiered standard of materiality (as opposed to a single
standard of favorability).' 4 The standard applied and therefore the re-
sult in a particular case will often depend on the pigeonhole into which
the case can be placed, and those pigeonholes are regulated by nebulous
terms: "pejury," "specific request, .... general request."' 47 Furthermore,
a reviewing court must apply these varying standards retrospectively to a
143. See, eg., United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 570, 577 (9th Cir.) (no abuse of discre-
tion in trial court's refusal to order disclosure after in camera review), cerL denied, 105 S.
CL 221 (1984); United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221, 1227 (7th Cir. 1975) (clearly
erroneous standard applies to in camera determination of Jencks Act material), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 765 (5th Cir.) (in camera
ruling by trial judge as to favorability of evidence given great deference by appellate
court), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); see also United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304,
1305 (10th Cir. 1981) (abuse of discretion standard applied to trial court's pre-trial re-
fusal to order disclosure of prosecution's witnesses). But see State v. Fleischman, 10 Or.
App. 22, 31-32, 495 P.2d 277, 282 (1972) (appellate court reverses trial court's in cam-
era ruling denying defendant access to police personnel file; no discussion of standard of
review applied).
144. Of course, the government may refuse to comply with an in camera ruling of
disclosure. This possibility is not, however, a threat to finality of judgments. Even in
current practice the issue of prosecutorial refusal to disclose is resolved on appeal before
trial. See, eg., United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1984) (govern-
ment appeal of trial court's dismissal of indictment for failure to comply with discovery
order); United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 297-98, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1975) (govern-
ment appeal of trial court's pre-trial order excluding testimony of witnesses whose names
and addresses are not disclosed; abuse of discretion standard of review).
145. It should be noted that another expense of retrospective review is that if sup-
pressed evidence is found to be material, it may be impossible to re-try the defendant. See
Anderson v. South Carolina, 542 F. Supp. 725, 734 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 887
(4th Cir. 1983). This problem, of course, would not arise if disclosure was ordered either
before trial or during trial, pursuant to an in camera determination.
146. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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situation in which the effect of suppression cannot by definition be deter-
mined with any certainty. 48 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that con-
siderable judicial energy has been spent in plugging suppressed evidence
into the overly complicated Agurs system. Through elaborate appellate
review, concepts and labels that would not seem the least bit pertinent to
the Brady right of access have in fact become determinative. 149 More-
over, uncertainty of application has usually resulted in rulings unfavora-
ble to defendants, thus further diluting the Brady promise of access to
favorable evidence.15°
The lower courts applying Agurs have encountered several major
problems in finding the correct materiality pigeonhole. Reading the pig-
eonholes from top to bottom, the first question encountered is: "what is
perjury?" This issue will be intensely disputed by the advocates, with the
prosecutor seeking to avoid this most pro-defense pigeonhole of material-
ity.1 5' The most common type of case occurs when the prosecution's
witness denies that he has agreed to a deal with the state. If a deal has in
fact been agreed to in accordance with principles of contract law, testi-
mony directly contradictory to the existence of the deal will usually be
deemed to be perjury. 152 If the prosecutor has a mere "understanding"
with the witness, however, or if the deal were discussed only generally
and was not made definite until after the witness testifies, the lower
courts have usually refused to apply the perjury standard of materiality
under Agurs. 153 In effect, the rulings of lower courts have made it easier
for a prosecutor to choreograph his actions so that he can make an infor-
mal deal with the witness and yet sidestep the pro-defense standard of
148. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 157-79 and accompanying text.
150. A parallel dilution occurred when the Supreme Court adopted a vague and specu-
lative approach to the right of an indigent criminal defendant to counsel. See Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339
(1963). This problem was corrected, at least as to felony cases, in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
151. The prosecutor's efforts will be especially important if the defendant had not
made a specific request for the allegedly impeaching material. In this situation, a finding
of perjury will be the difference between the application of the most pro-defendant and
the most pro-prosecution standards of materiality.
152. Compare United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 802-05 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (major-
ity arguing that witness' testimony about her arrangements with government was perjuri-
ous), modified, 648 F.2d 737 (1981) with id. at 808-10 (Tamm, J., dissenting) (arguing
that witness' testimony was simply confusing). See also United States v. Bigeleisen, 625
F.2d 203, 209 (8th Cir. 1980) (analyzing government's failure to correct perjurious testi-
mony of prosecution witness).
153. See, e.g., Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1464-65 (1lth Cir.) (no perjury even
though evidentiary hearing showed conflicting evidence on the issue), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 510 (1983); Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir.) (no certain proof that deal
existed at time witness testified), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109 (1982); United States v.
Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1978) (no showing of actual knowl-
edge by witness of binding promise).
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materiality when such a deal remains undisclosed."
Similarly, with respect to substantive testimony, a court presented
with a witness' suppressed prior statement contradicting in court testi-
mony must decide whether the witness has committed perjury. After
Agurs, lower courts presented with this question have generally held
against defendants, on the ground that "mere" inconsistency, and not
perjury, was shown.1 55
Agurs' second standard of materiality is for information that was sup-
pressed by the prosecutor and specifically requested by defense counsel.
The bone of contention here-assuming of course that the suppression is
ever discovered-is whether the defense counsel specifically requested
the information. Again, because of the pigeonholes established by Agurs,
a determination of specificity will be of utmost importance to the parties,
and thus heavily litigated and adjudicated. If defense counsel can show
that his request was specific, chances of reversal increase significantly.15 6
The Court in Agurs gave the lower courts precious little guidance in
the now-crucial determination of whether a defense request was specific
or general. The Court merely categorized the obvious cases. First, a
request for "anything exculpatory" or "all Brady material" would be
deemed a general request.157 Second, defense counsel's request in Brady
itself for "Boblit's statements" was held to be specific because "[i]t gave
the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired." ' Obviously,
there is a large gray area between the examples considered by the Agurs
court.
Left basically to their own devices, lower courts have taken different
views regarding when a defense counsel's request can be deemed specific.
The problem cases occur, of course, when defense counsel has no clue as
154. See, eg., United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932, 937 (5th Cir.) (witness compen-
sated after testifying), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977).
155. Kg, United States v. Daniels, 723 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1024-26 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 906 (1982); Lindhorst v. United States, 658 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982). It should be noted that even if a finding of perjury is in fact
made, reversal is hardly automatic after Agurs. See, eg., United States v. Meinster, 619
F.2d 1041, 1043-45 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Runge, 593 F.2d 66, 73-74 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979). This is particularly true if the suppressed evidence is
valuable for its impeachment effect only and is not admissible as substantive proof. Some
courts have in fact held that a pro-prosecution standard of materiality should apply when
evidence of perjury relates solely to impeachment. See, eg., United States v. Brown, 562
F.2d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 1977). Application of a pro-prosecution standard is undoubt-
edly contrary to the pro-defense standards set forth in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Moreover, the inconsis-
tent application of multiple materiality standards again indicates a fatal flaw in the Agurs
system. Such inconsistency would not occur with a single pre-trial standard of
favorability governing the defendant's right to disclosure.
156. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
157. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
158. Id. at 106.
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to what is in the prosecutor's files.' 59 A few courts, presented with this
anomaly left by Agurs, have been kind enough to evaluate the specificity
of the defense request in light of how reasonably specific defense counsel
could be expected to have been under the circumstances.1 60 The vast
majority of lower courts, however, ignores the plight of defense counsel,
and looks solely at whether the prosecutor was adequately notified of
specific evidence. 6' Indeed, this focus on the mind of the prosecutor is
supported by Agurs, which basically responded to the problem of the
shroud over defense counsel by applying the pro-prosecution standard of
materiality for general requests. 62
The emphasis on notice to the prosecutor, as opposed to the knowl-
edge available to the defense counsel, has created several pitfalls for de-
fendants and has accordingly diminished the promise of Brady. For
instance, defense counsel must avoid the "overkill" that would occur
with a broad, voluminous, all-encompassing request. Defense counsel in
making a broad request may merely be trying to cover all the possibilities
in light of his ignorance of what is actually in the prosecutor's file. Yet a
reviewing court is likely to look at the volume of the request and hold
that the request does not help the prosecutor to identify any particular
piece of evidence as exculpatory. 163 On the other hand, by steering clear
of the Scylla of overbreadth, defense counsel may encounter the Charyb-
dis of overspecificity. Again by focusing on the mind of the prosecutor,
lower courts have generally construed defense requests under the doc-
159. Of course, the existence of certain material can be predicted with reasonable accu-
racy, and as to such material, a specific request can be and usually is made by defense
counsel. See, e.g., Perkins v. Le Fevre, 691 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1982) (felony murder
charge; "rap" sheet of prosecution witness); United States v. Sternstein, 596 F.2d 528,
529 (2d Cir. 1979) (tax fraud charge; report by investigating Internal Revenue Service
agents); United States v. Fontaine, 575 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir.) (extortion charge; request
for evidence respecting voice exemplars), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978); White v.
Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1358 (5th Cir. 1977) (murder charge; request for bullets tying
defendant to crime).
160. See supra note 109.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052, 1062 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2678 (1984); United States v. Martorano, 663 F.2d 1113, 1114 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Salemme, 11 Mass. App.
Ct. 208, 222 & n.12, 416 N.E.2d 205, 214-15 & n.12 (1981) (defense request for "any and
all information... of statements of promises, inducements or rewards ... to any wit-
nesses is a general request").
162. See Brown v. Chaney, 53 U.S.L.W. 3433, 3434 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1984) (No. 84-169)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
106-07 (1976). See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Cady, 710 F.2d 1214, 1218 (7th Cir. 1983) (defense counsel
chided for "buckshot approach"); United States v. Martorano, 663 F.2d 1113, 1114 (1st
Cir. 1981) (defense requests were "lengthy and comprehensive" but were "basically de-
tailed boiler plate requests"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Weiner,
578 F.2d 757, 767 (9th Cir.) (defense counsel's voluminous request labeled "shotgun ap-
proach" and equivalent to no request at all), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United
States v. Lasky, 548 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1977) (voluminous request "places the gov-
ernment in no better position than if no request had been made"), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
821 (1977).
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trine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Given these pitfalls, it is
apparent that defense counsel is left to blind luck in framing a request
specific enough to cover evidence the existence of which he could not
reasonably be expected to know. 65
Another pitfall suffered by some defendants after Agurs occurs when
the court finds that a specific request has indeed been made but fails
properly to plug that finding into the appropriate materiality pigeonhole.
In United States v. Farid,'66 for example, the court held that defense
counsel "specifically requested" impeaching information about a particu-
lar prosecution witness.167 The court then stated, however, that the
suppressed statement was not material because it was not "sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt." 6 ' The court failed to follow the overcompli-
cated materiality standards of Agurs by, in effect, applying the material-
ity standard for general requests to evidence that was in fact specifically
requested by defense counsel.' 69 This problem would not arise if a single
standard of review-that the evidence is favorable-applied pursuant to
a review of the prosecutor's file before or during trial. 17 0
The final problem unnecessarily created by the Agurs three-tiered ma-
teriality standards occurs when the prosecution suppresses more than
one piece of evidence. The first question, unanswered by "Agurs, is
whether the reviewing court should determine materiality in light of the
cumulative effect of the suppressions. A cumulative analysis makes sense
because it would be anomalous to reverse when the prosecution sup-
164. For a discussion of the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of others-see 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 47.23, at 123 (4th ed. 1973). See, eg., United States v.
DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 958 (lst Cir. 1978) (carefully drawn request for information
about "rewards" offered by prosecution technically does not include letters written by
prosecution on behalf of witness), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978); United States v.
Oliver, 570 F.2d 397, 401 (1st Cir. 1978) (statement of eyewitness not covered by defense
request because she was technically not prosecution witness, informant, co-defendant or
active participant).
165. Of course, even if a defense request is deemed specific, reversal does not always, or
even ordinarily, follow. See, eg., United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir.)
(tape as to witness' motivations not material because witness was impeached at trial),
cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 3516 (1984); King v. Ponte, 717 F.2d 635, 64546 (1st Cir. 1983)
(evidence cumulative); Wagster v. Overberg, 560 F.2d 735, 739-40 (6th Cir. 1977) (wit-
ness' statement specifically requested; nevertheless it would not further defendant's the-
ory of the case).
166. 733 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 1320.
168. Id. at 1321.
169. Farid is not the only case in which a court has misapplied Agurs by judging the
materiality of specifically requested evidence under the reasonable doubt standard re-
served for generally requested evidence. See Note, The Prosecutor's Dilemma-A Duty to
Disclose or a Duty Not to Commit Reversible Error, 40 La. L. Rev. 513, 523 (1980) (sug-
gesting Louisiana Supreme Court applied Agurs standard erroneously).
170. Even if an in camera review is not adopted, a single standard of post-trial review
of materiality is at any rate preferable to the complications and collateral issues imposed
by Agurs. For a suggested single standard of materiality, see United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 121-22 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
presses one "big" piece of evidence, but not when it suppresses several
"small" pieces of evidence having a "big" cumulative effect. 171 Nonethe-
less, it is possible for a court after Agurs to analyze each piece of sup-
pressed evidence seriatim, and refuse to reverse because no single piece of
evidence was material under Agurs. Such a result is certainly not prohib-
ited by Agurs, and some lower courts have indeed failed to consider the
cumulative effect of multiple suppressions. 172
An even more perplexing question arises when a reviewing court is
willing to do a cumulative analysis but is unable to fit all the suppressed
pieces of evidence into the same Agurs pigeonhole. What standard of
materiality is to be used if some but not all of the suppressed evidence
were specifically requested? This situation may arise infrequently but
certainly can occur, as the Third Circuit discovered in United states ex
rel. Marzeno v. Gengler.'73 In Marzeno, the prosecutor suppressed a spe-
cifically requested police report and unrequested bits of evidence im-
peaching a government witness. 174 The court of appeals held that the
evidence had to be considered cumulatively,1 75 but it did not specify
under which Agurs pigeonhole this analysis was to take place. The
Marzeno court avoided this "more difficult question under the Agurs de-
cision" by holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was not
material even if it were all treated as if it had been specifically re-
quested.1 76 A different though no less evasive approach was taken by the
Fourth Circuit in Anderson v. South Carolina.177 The court deftly side-
stepped the problem of multiple suppressions of evidence-some of
which was specifically requested and some generally requested-by stat-
ing that under the circumstances of the case a cumulative analysis was
not even required because the generally requested evidence was itself ma-
terial within its own Agurs pigeonhole.' 78 It can be expected that courts
confronted with this situation in the future will take similar steps to
evade the problem left by Agurs' various standards of materiality. 79
171. See United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 736-37 (3d Cir.
1978); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 557.2, at 359 (2d ed. 1982).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (four
categories of suppressed evidence; no cumulative analysis); Maddox v. Montgomery, 718
F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (prosecution suppressed photograph, police exami-
nation and witness statement; no cumulative analysis); Hicks v. Scurr, 671 F.2d 255, 261
(8th Cir.) (four pieces of evidence suppressed; no cumulative analysis), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 968 (1982).
173. 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978).
174. Id. at 737.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 737-38.
177. 709 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 888. Interestingly, the lower court in Anderson had approached the problem
differently, holding that the suppressed evidence, viewed cumulatively, would satisfy even
the pro-prosecution standard of materiality for generally requested evidence. See Ander-
son v. South Carolina, 542 F. Supp. 725, 738 (D.S.C. 1982), af'd, 709 F.2d 887 (4th Cir.
1983) (per curiam).
179. It should be noted that the already too difficult three-tiered standard of Agurs has
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In sum, Agurs not only provides inadequate protection of the right of
access to favorable evidence, but it also imposes substantial and unneces-
sary costs on appellate review. The time has come for a more reliable
and efficient remedy for the Brady right.
II. THE IN CAMERA HEARING SOLUTION
A. The Need for a Neutral and Detached Determination of
Favorability of Evidence
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for an independent and
unbiased adjudicator to protect citizens' fundamental fourth amendment
rights. A similarly objective fact-finder should be employed to protect an
accused's fundamental right of access to exculpatory evidence.
In Johnson v. United States,'8 ° the Supreme Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that a police officer's search of a dwelling was constitu-
tional because the officer had probable cause to search. The Court stated
that the warrant requirement prohibits a warrantless search even though
the police make an independent determination of probable cause, and
even though such a determination could be found correct on retrospec-
tive review. 81 The Court reasoned that a warrant procedure is necessary
to ensure that the determination of probable cause is in fact reliable.'1 2
The Court noted that reliability is guaranteed only when the determina-
tion is made by "a neutral and detached magistrate" rather than "by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime"."8 3 It is implicit in this rationale that a police officer, because of
the nature of his role, may understandably resolve doubts in favor of a
been further complicated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In that circuit, if
the suppressed evidence relates only to impeachment of prosecution witnesses, it is not
deemed material unless it would probably have resulted in acquittal had it been used at
trial. See Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 940 (1977). See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process--Defendant Not
Entitled to New Trial Unless Evidence Suppressed by Prosecution Probably Would Have
Resulted in Acquittal, 48 Miss. L.J. 647 (1977) (discussing Fifth Circuit's move to strin-
gent standard). The Garrison standard is the same as the standard of materiality for
newly discovered evidence-a standard that was rejected by the Court in Agurs for cases
in which prosecutorial suppression is involved. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
111 (1976). In effect, the Fifth Circuit requires that suppressed impeachment evidence
must have a greater (retrospective) effect on the jury than other types of suppressed evi-
dence. See Garrison, 540 F.2d at 1276 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The Garrison case not
only adds a fourth tier of materiality to an already cumbersome three-tiered analysis; it
also creates another pigeonhole problem: When is evidence useable solely for impeach-
ment? Id. at 1277 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (suppressed information could be used for
purposes other than impeachment because it would have supported defendant's substan-
tive alibi defense); see also Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1979) (prior
inconsistent statement goes to "substantive issue"; materiality standard for specifically
requested evidence applied), cert denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
180. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
181. Id. at 13-17.
182. See id. at 13-14.
183. Id. at 14.
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finding of probable cause. Forcing the police officer to be an objective
decisionmaker thus puts that person in a nearly impossible role, and citi-
zens will suffer when the policeperson inevitably acts as an advocate in a
competitive enterprise. The role of determining probable cause, there-
fore, must be given instead to an independent and unbiased
adjudicator. 184
The fifth and sixth amendment rights to a fair trial are as important in
the constitutional hierarchy as the fourth amendment right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 5 Furthermore, the right of
184. Of course it is no secret that although the Supreme Court has adhered to the
rationale of the warrant requirement, the application of the warrant requirement has be-
come the exception, not the rule. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)
(exception for search incident to arrest in automobile); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (inventory exception); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
415 (1976) (no warrant required for public arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (no warrant necessary for search incident to custodial arrest); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970) (automobile exception). In fact, it has been argued
that the Court has basically abandoned the warrant clause of the fourth amendment in
favor of the reasonableness clause. See United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2652
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting "emerging tendency on the part of the Court
to convert the [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] decision into a general statement that
the Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable"). Nonetheless, the
rationale for requiring a warrant procedure has never been rejected. See Illinois v. Gates,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-32 (1983); id. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (both majority and
dissenting opinions stress the need to "preserve the role of magistrates as independent
arbiters of probable cause").
A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule could be read to reject the implication
from Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), that good faith, understanda-
ble, but incorrect, determinations of probable cause are at the heart of what is prohibited
by the fourth amendment. In its present state, however, the good faith exception as
adopted by the Supreme Court does not allow the police to benefit from a good faith but
mistaken determination of probable cause by an advocate-police officer. Rather, it allows
the police to rely on determinations of probable cause by a neutral and detached magis-
trate. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416-17 (1984). If anything, Leon
reaffirms the central role of an objective adjudicator in the determination of probable
cause. Good faith mistakes concerning whether a warrant itself is required, as well as
whether probable cause exists when a warrant is not required, are still subject to the
exclusionary rule. See id. at 3422.
It is debatable whether the magistrate's unbiased and independent role in determining
probable cause is fully effectuated in practice. See authorities cited id. at 3418 n.14. To
the extent that the magistrate is not an effective buffer between police and citizen, the
solution lies not in rejection of the Johnson rationale, but in expenditure of resources to
hire and train new magistrates, thereby relieving existing workload burdens. The magis-
trate would also be more effective if he could make a determination of probable cause
based on complete factual data. But see Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-35 (1983)
(overturning Court's prior efforts to prohibit magistrate's reliance on conclusions of po-
lice and informants).
185. In fact, the right to a fair trial has received far more favorable treatment from the
Burger Court than has the fourth amendment right. Compare Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853, 856-57 & n.5 (1975) (failure to permit defense summation warrants retrial) witl
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (no habeus corpus relief on basis of fourth
amendment violation). The right referred to in the text-the right to a fair trial-is really
an umbrella term including compulsory process, confrontation, effective counsel and the
Brady right. All these rights coalesce into a right to an effective defense. See United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982); Westen, supra note 12, at 182.
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access to exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor's custody is an inherent
guarantee of the right to a fair trial.186 Yet, unlike the fourth amend-
ment guarantee, protection of the fundamental right of access to exculpa-
tory evidence is in the hands of a naturally biased party-the prosecutor.
Just as the police officer is naturally prone to resolve against the citizen
all doubts about probable cause, so is the prosecutor, by the nature of his
function prone to resolve against the defendant all doubt regarding the
existence of favorable evidence.' 87 Therefore, just as an independent ad-
judicator is required to protect against biased determinations of probable
cause, so too is an independent adjudicator required to protect against a
one-sided review of the prosecutor's file for evidence favorable to the
defense.' 88
B. The Right to an In Camera Hearing Today
Under current practice, the trial court will conduct an in camera re-
view for favorable evidence in the prosecutor's custody in two limited
situations. First, if the prosecutor is in doubt as to whether certain evi-
dence is "material" under Brady, or has other objections to pre-trial dis-
closure of admittedly favorable evidence, the prosecutor can submit the
information to the trial court for in camera review.'89 Second, if defend-
ant can make a preliminary showing that the prosecutor has materially
favorable evidence in his custody, the trial court has discretion either to
order disclosure of the evidence or, if the prosecutor objects, to under-
take an in camera review of the specified material, but not of the entire
file.' Many courts hold, however, that if the prosecutor, in response to
the defendant's preliminary showing of materiality, nonetheless denies
186. See California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
187. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
188. Even though the policies behind the warrant requirement and a Brady in camera
hearing requirement are analogous, there is no analogy in Brady for the many exceptions
to the warrant requirement. These exceptions are based generally either on exigencies
that make it impossible to obtain a warrant or on lesser expectations of privacy. See, eg.,
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-96 (1974) (no practical difference between immedi-
ate warrantless search of car and immobilizing car until warrant obtained); United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (lawful arrest subordinates
individual's privacy interest to legitimate government interest); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (pursuit of fleeing armed robber justified warrantless search of build-
ing into which he had fled). Neither exigency nor lesser expectation of rights would
justify an exception to a criminal defendant's right to an unbiased review of the prosecu-
tor's file to determine whether favorable evidence was contained therein.
189. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also United States v.
Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 40, 44-45 (3d Cir. 1983) (government objects to pre-trial disclosure of
identity of witness due to intimidation of that witness), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 725
(1984).
190. See United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 1983), cerl denied, 104 S. Ct.
725 (1984); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 885-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 557-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State ex rel
Dooley v. Connall, 257 Or. 94, 103-04, 475 P.2d 582, 586-87 (1970).
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the existence of exculpatory evidence, the defendant has no right to an in
camera hearing, because effectuation of Brady rights centrally depends
on the integrity of the prosecutor. 19 The trial court's decision to con-
duct or to refuse to conduct an in camera hearing is reviewable only for
abuse of discretion.1 92
The current limited use of in camera hearings is insufficient to effectu-
ate the principles of Brady. The fundamental reliance on the good faith
and integrity of the prosecution is misplaced, but not because prosecutors
lack integrity or good faith. Rather, assuming that the prosecutor acts in
good faith and with integrity, the fact is that he reviews his file from an
advocate's point of view. Good faith and integrity do not and cannot
guarantee an objective review of the file by the prosecutor. Thus, the
fundamental Brady problem-that of forcing the prosecutor into a schiz-
ophrenic role-is not solved by a limited in camera right that ultimately
can be triggered only by the prosecutor's action.193 Even assuming, how-
ever, that we do not rely on totally the prosecutor, but instead require, as
some courts do, 194 an in camera hearing on defendant's preliminary
showing of materiality, such an in camera right is still too limited. Re-
quiring defendant to show that certain evidence is material before de-
fendant even has access to the evidence is merely another version of the
Agurs anomaly: How do you specify evidence that you do not know is
there? Proving materiality in the dark is no more viable than making a
specific request in the dark.' 95
191. See, eg., United States v. Eustace, 423 F.2d 569, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258, 262 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984 (1968); United
States v. Houston, 339 F. Supp. 762, 764-65 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Cobb, 271
F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
192. See United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 850-51 (1lth Cir. 1984); United
States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1446-67, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gaston,
608 F.2d 607, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1979).
193. It could be argued that even with an advocate's eye, a prosecutor in good faith
will at least be in doubt about the favorability of some evidence, and thus will turn it over
for in camera review, especially if the evidence is "flagged" by a specific request. The
cases in which the prosecutor has not even entertained a doubt about clearly favorable
evidence belie this argument. See Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1348, 1357 (10th Cir.
1984) (FBI reports implying that defendant may not have committed crime), cert. denied,
53 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1984) (No. 84-169); Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186,
190-91 (8th Cir. 1980) (police reports focusing on another suspect); People v. Cwikla, 46
N.Y.2d 434, 441-42, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 1073-74, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 106 (1979) (under-
standings with prosecution witness); People v. Kitt, 86 A.D.2d 465, 466-67, 450
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (1982) (lab reports). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text
195. In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), the Court required
defendant to prove that evidence (possible testimony of deported witnesses) was materi-
ally favorable, even though defendant did not have access to the evidence. See id. at 873.
This is analogous to the quandary faced by defendant in obtaining an in camera hearing
under Brady. It should be noted, however, that the burden on defendant is greater under
Brady than under Valenzuela-Bernal. In Valenzuela-Bernal, defendant was required to
show a material violation of compulsory process with respect to specific witnesses with
whom defendant had been in contact. See id. at 871. Moreover, the government was
exhorted to allow defendant to interview the witness if at all possible. See id. at 867. In
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Even presuming that under current practice defendant earns a right to
a limited in camera review of specified information, it does not necessar-
ily follow that the court will allow disclosure of all favorable evidence.
Many courts instead have used the Agurs standards of materiality for
post-trial review to determine whether defendant is constitutionally enti-
tled to evidence before or during trial.'9 6 If Agurs standards are used at
the in camera hearing, only evidence that can be deemed material in
futuro, not that which is merely favorable, must be disclosed. Obviously,
a pre-trial or at-trial determination of whether evidence is material under
Agurs-as opposed to "favorable" under common standards of rele-
vance-is at best imprecise.197
There is authority in Agurs for the proposition that disclosure in cam-
era should be governed by the Agurs post-trial standards of review. The
Court did, after all, state: "Rlo reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor
will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial."' " This passage certainly does not contemplate
a constitutional entitlement to disclosure after in camera review of evi-
dence that is merely favorable. The Agurs Court, however, was most
concerned with, and was specifically addressing, post-trial review of the
favorability of suppressed evidence.' 99 A disclosure standard of mere
favorability or relevance would not be justified after trial, given the coun-
tervailing interest in finality of judgments and the presumed uselessness
contrast, a defendant required to make a preliminary showing of materiality under Brady
does not, by definition, have any access to the information in the prosecutor's file. De-
fense counsel often cannot know what does and does not exist.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 199 (3d Cir.) (Seitz, CJ.,
concurring) (Agurs materiality standard applies to trial court's decision to disclose infor-
mation pursuant to in camera hearing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981); United States
v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1980) (appellate court applies Agurs reasonable
doubt standard to trial court's in camera ruling).
197. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1313 (3d Cir. 1984) (court incapable
of speculating before trial whether information would be deemed material after trial
under Agurs retrospective standards). Imprecision under current in camera practice is
exacerbated because of the varying standards of materiality imposed by Agurs. Thus, if
the prosecutor submits generally requested or unrequested information for in camera re-
view, disclosure would not follow unless the information would create a reasonable doubt
in futuro. United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text. If the information were specifically requested, dis-
closure would follow only if the information might affect the outcome. See supra notes
62-65 and accompanying text. The overly complicated Agurs standards have created ex-
treme difficulty for reviewing courts as a post-trial matter. See supra section II.C. and
accompanying notes. Transplanting such standards to the pre-trial estimation of the effect
of evidence on a jury that has not yet rendered a verdict necessarily creates even greater
problems of judicial determination. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 200
(3d Cir.) (Seitz, C.J., concurring) ("I recognize that because one cannot predict how a
trial may develop it is often difficult and somewhat impractical to determine before trial
whether the failure to disclose certain material would meet the Agurs standard."), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981).
198. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
199. See id. at 103.
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of reversal when evidence is not in fact material. 2" These reasons do not
apply to disclosure before or at trial. There is no final judgment that will
be upset if evidence that is merely favorable or relevant to an accused is
disclosed before a judgment is rendered. Moreover, it cannot be said at
the point of the in camera hearing that disclosure of merely favorable
evidence would be useless to the defendant. Indeed, favorable evidence is
by definition useful to the accused if it is disclosed before or during trial.
The spirit of Brady requires disclosure of all favorable evidence at the
time it can be used.2" Accordingly, the better view, even under current
limited practice, is that the trial court after in camera review should dis-
close all information that can reasonably be deemed helpful or favorable
to defendant.20 2
Even if the court under current in camera practice were to order dis-
closure of information merely favorable to defendant, the fact remains
that the present use of in camera hearings is far too limited to solve the
problems posed by Brady and Agurs. So long as the triggering of an in
camera hearing is within the prosecutor's control, perhaps fortuitously
helped along by defense counsel's guesswork, the right to an in camera
hearing will remain a Brady right in Agurs clothing.
C. The Absolute Right to an In Camera Hearing
There are two possible ways to provide more effective access to excul-
patory evidence as guaranteed by Brady: an open file rule or a blanket
right to in camera inspection of the prosecutor's file. Both solutions
avoid the Agurs problem of prosecutorial bias in determining favorability
of evidence. Both avoid reliance on defense counsel's adventitious guess-
work. Both avoid speculative post-trial review under complicated and
varying standards of materiality. Both preserve the finality of judgments.
1. Advantages of In Camera Hearing over Open File Requirement
An in camera inspection requirement, however, would better fit the
200. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
201. See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States
v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 130, at 145.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984) (witnesses
not to be called by prosecution may be "favorable" to defendant's case and their identities
disclosable after in camera hearing); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 886
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (transcript of co-defendant's testimony "could be deemed helpful"). Of
course, even if evidence is deemed favorable, the time at which it must be disclosed to the
defendant presents a separate question. For instance, if the prosecutor can show that
witnesses may be threatened, it is certainly within the discretion of the trial court to defer
disclosure of the witnesses' names and their criminal records, if any, until trial. See
United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (defendant's "right to a fair trial
will be fully protected if disclosure is made the day that the witness testifies"), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 725 (1984); United States v. Houston, 339 F. Supp. 762, 766 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (disclosure of criminal records of prosecution witnesses should be deferred until
trial).
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Brady right than would an overbroad open file requirement. Brady guar-
antees access only to favorable evidence.2 "3 An open file requirement
would guarantee access to all evidence, favorable and unfavorable. Ac-
cording to the courts, intimidation of witnesses, perjury and interference
with continuing investigations would follow inevitably from an open file
requirement.2 4 Moreover, those opposed to the open file rule seem to
have an abiding resentment of the fact that defense counsel could sit back
and allow the prosecutor to do his work for him, merely waiting for an
entire file to be placed on his desk.2"5
Whatever the merits of such concerns about an open file rule,206 a right
to in camera inspection does not suffer from the same infirmities. The
court, after an in camera review, can fully effectuate Brady by disclosing
only favorable evidence. Granting defendant access to favorable evi-
dence does nothing but further the quest for truth. Any dangers of abuse
by defendant-such as pressuring favorable witnesses-can be controlled
by delaying disclosure on a showing of proof by the prosecutor. Like-
wise, privileged information or information pertinent to continuing inves-
tigations can be screened and edited by the trial court in camera, again
on a reasonable showing by the prosecutor. Furthermore, the court
could deny disclosure if defense counsel had reasonable alternative access
to the favorable information in the prosecutor's fie, thus avoiding the
defense counsel's unfair exploitation of the prosecutor's investigation,
which might occur under an open file system.
The in camera procedure thus avoids the inherent dangers of an open
file rule. More importantly, however, the in camera solution is more ef-
fective than Agurs in providing access to exculpatory evidence, because
the defendant will receive evidence determined to be favorable by an un-
biased, independent adjudicator, and such evidence will be disclosed at a
time when it can actually be useful in presenting a meaningful defense.
2. A Proposal for In Camera Hearings
This proposal for a per se right to an in camera inspection proceeds as
follows: At the time of pre-trial discovery, the prosecutor must submit
his entire file on the case to the trial court or to a magistrate. The extent
of information that must be included in the file would be governed by
current standards as to whether information is within the custody of the
prosecutor for Brady purposes." 7 Thus the prosecutor has the duty to
203. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
205. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-11 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786, 795 (1972). See generally Babcock, supra note 16, at 1134 (considering feasibil-
ity of imposing constitutional duty on prosecutor to provide evidence to defendant).
206. See Brennan, supra note 21, at 288-90.
207. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (Information known
by one prosecutor is attributed to another: "To the extent this places a burden on the
large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry that bur-
den and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer
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collect and include in his file all information held by the state.20 8 When
presented with the file, the independent adjudicator shall determine
whether, and to what extent, the file contains information favorable to
the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense. The adjudica-
tor can be aided in determining favorability through adversarial submis-
sions by prosecutor and defense counsel. Such submissions would not,
however, be disclosed to the opposing party.209 Anything found by the
court or magistrate to have a tendency to further the preparation or pres-
entation of the defendant's case shall be presumed disclosable.210 Once a
preliminary determination of favorability is made, the adjudicator would
notify the prosecutor of the information proposed for disclosure. At this
point the prosecutor could object to disclosure in whole or part by a
particularized showing of proof on any of four grounds.
The first basis on which the prosecutor may object to disclosure is that
the information is privileged and that such privilege outweighs the de-
fendant's constitutional right to prepare and present a defense.2 " Sec-
who deals with it."); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984) (Court
warns that coordinated efforts by various law enforcement agencies may result in attribu-
tion of constructive knowledge of prosecutor of all information held by such agencies.);
United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The government cannot
compartmentalize the Department of Justice and permit it to bring a charge affecting a
government employee in the Post Office and use him as its principal witness, but deny
having access to the Post Office files."); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.
1964) ("The police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if
they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure."); State v.
Fleischman, 10 Or. App. 22, 32, 495 P.2d 277, 282 (1972) (Court held that evidence in
hands of a different agency was within the prosecutor's constructive custody.).
208. See supra note 207.
209. The helpfulness of adversarial submissions, in light of the fact that the adjudicator
is relatively unfamiliar with the case, is noted by the court in United States v. Gleason,
265 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
210. As previously noted, a standard of mere favorability is logically and legitimately
applied to pre-judgment disclosures, as opposed to the application of higher materiality
standards when the judgment is final. See supra notes 128-34, 198-202 and accompanying
text. Information could be deemed favorable, and thus subject to disclosure, even if it
may not ultimately be admissible at trial. Brady is concerned with the defendant's ability
to prepare a defense. Consequently, information that furthers the preparation of exculpa-
tory material is as favorable as the exculpatory material itself. United States v. Gleason,
265 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). A clear example is the name of a witness not to
be called by the prosecution. See United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir.
1984). See generally Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 130, at 146-47 (court must be con-
cerned with any failure to reveal evidence before trial because suppression may adversely
affect preparation).
211. Rulings respecting the conflict between privileges and defendant's right to a fair
trial are routinely made by trial and appellate courts under current practice. Therefore, a
ruling as to privilege by the trial court or magistrate as proposed in this Article would be
in accordance with well established principles. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 705-06 (1974) (executive privilege); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (confi-
dentiality of juvenile report); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1967) (informer's
privilege); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1980) (in camera
hearing required to determine scope of newsperson's qualified privilege in light of defend-
ant's conflicting right to exculpatory evidence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). For
an interesting case in which a juvenile's right to confidentiality conflicted with his own
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ond, objection may be made because disclosure of the information could
reasonably lead to threats or danger to witnesses. If the adjudicator is
satisfied with the prosecutor's showing on this point, disclosure of the
information can be delayed until the trial.2" 2
The prosecutor may also resist disclosure on the grounds that defense
counsel has equivalent, alternative access to the information, or can be
directed to such information. For instance, if the favorable information
were in a public record, a copy of which was in the prosecutor's file,
disclosure pursuant to in camera review would not be required if the
prosecutor or the court informed defense counsel how to obtain his own
copy of such a record.2" 3 Denial of disclosure in such a situation would
be determined by prospective application of the familiar "equal access"
exception to Brady, which is currently applied after trial.2" 4 The advan-
tage of prospective application of the equal access principle is that de-
fense counsel will, on notice from the court, obtain the information from
another source.215 As currently applied, the equal access exception sim-
ply punishes defendants for the failure of defense counsel to consider al-
ternative access to favorable evidence. 2 6 Such a result is justifiable on
right to an effective defense, see In re Richard J., 122 Misc. 2d 839, 843, 472 N.Y.S.2d
264, 267 (N.Y. Fain. CL 1984) (exculpatory evidence as to juvenile in his own probation
file protected by privilege; in camera hearing should be held to resolve conflict between
juvenile's right to confidentiality and his right to effective defense).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (Brady right to
information that defendants could use on cross-examination would be fully protected if
disclosure made on day witness testifies), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 725 (1984); United
States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779-80 (4th Cir.) (no prejudice in delaying until trial the
disclosure of existence of exculpatory witness; pre-trial disclosure could have led to intim-
idation of (different) witness for the prosecution), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970).
213. See Lewis v. United States, 393 A.2d 109, 116 (D.C. 1978).
214. The "equal access" exception provides that the prosecutor has no duty to disclose
favorable evidence that can be easily obtained by defense counsel without resort to the
prosecutor's file. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir. 1983)
(defendants knew and dealt regularly with witnesses who were alleged to be exculpatory);
United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1983) (witness' statements could
have been discovered "with any reasonable diligence"); United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d
1301, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (bullets were easily available to defense counsel).
215. It may be argued that requiring defense counsel to do "leg work" to get favorable
information lacks utility when such information can be easily turned over by the court
pursuant to an in camera hearing. However, the principle that the defense counsel should
not be allowed unfairly to "sponge" off the prosecutor is deeply ingrained in our adver-
sary system. See generally Babcock, supra note 16, at 1134-35 (discussing tension between
adversarial system and prosecutor's duty to aid defense counsel). Notifying the defense
counsel that exculpatory information exists and is accessible elsewhere is an appropriate
balance of adversary policies and the right to an effective defense. Defense counsel is
required to put in some effort, and defendant has access to favorable evidence. See
United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1250 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979). Of course it is possible that even when directed to an alternative source,
defense counsel will not bother to retrieve exculpatory information. This is not a Brady
problem, however, but rather a problem of ineffective assistance of counsel See generally,
Babcock, supra note 16, at 1163-74 (counsel ineffective when falls below acceptable
"range of competence" in accumulating favorable evidence).
216. See supra notes 214-15.
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retrospective review, but happily can be avoided by use of the in camera
hearing.
The final objection that the prosecution should be allowed to make
prior to disclosure, presuming a particularized showing of proof, is that
the material proposed for disclosure is not in fact favorable to the presen-
tation or preparation of the defense.217 Such an objection performs a
valuable service because at the time of in camera review the prosecutor is
more familiar with the case than is the independent adjudicator. Evi-
dence that appears favorable may be re-evaluated in light of the prosecu-
tor's particularized explanation of the nuances of the case. The ultimate
determination of favorability, however, must be made by the court.218
The court's determination after a pre-trial in camera hearing that in-
formation in the prosecutor's file is not favorable to the defense will not
fully satisfy the defendant's right of access to exculpatory evidence. 219
The issue of favorability must remain open throughout the trial, because
it may not be until the litigation unfolds that the favorability of a piece of
information will become apparent to the court.220 In order to be an effec-
tive guarantee of access to exculpatory evidence, a per se right to in cam-
era inspection necessarily requires a continuing obligation on the part of
the independent adjudicator throughout the trial to evaluate whether in-
formation held by the prosecutor is favorable to the defense.22'
217. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
218. Because there are few if any countervailing interests not already accounted for by
the prosecutor's other available objections, any doubt as to favorability after the prosecu-
tor's showing should be resolved in favor of disclosure. Of course, defendant is not enti-
tled to disclosure of evidence unless it is favorable. At the point of in camera hearing,
however, there is little harm in allowing disclosure of even questionably favorable infor-
mation. This is distinguished from the more stringent review required once a judgment is
rendered, when re-trial would be a costly and useless act unless the undisclosed informa-
tion is truly favorable. See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1977)
("In [the post-trial review] situation, there is no justification for granting a new trial so
that a different jury might hear the same evidence.").
219. Under the in camera procedure outlined in this Article, the government must be
allowed an immediate right to appeal the fact-finder's rejection of prosecutorial objections
and consequent order of disclosure. Such an immediate appeal is provided for under the
current, limited in camera practice. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 40 (3d
Cir. 1983) (appeal from district court order compelling disclosure), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 725 (1984).
220. See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v.
Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 558-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Prosecutor's Duty, supra note
130, at 147-48.
221. Any harm to defendant resulting from disclosure during trial of information then
found to be favorable can be handled by continuance, within the discretion of the trial
court, as is the case under current law. See United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008
(lst Cir. 1984); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 180 (1984); United States v. Olson, 697 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1983); Duty of Dis-
closure, supra note 51, at 218-19.
The proposal in text requires that the court have continuing access to the prosecutor's
file throughout the trial. Also, if a magistrate has made the original in camera determina-
tion, the court would be obligated to obtain all pertinent information from the magistrate
in order to perform its role of adjudicator of favorability throughout the trial.
[Vol. 53
ACCESS TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
3. Standard of Review
If a per se right to in camera review is implemented, an obvious
ground of appeal for a convicted defendant is that the trial court erred in
its in camera decision that certain evidence was not favorable to the de-
fendant. In response to such a post-trial claim, the finality of the judg-
ment may be protected by one of two review-restraining concepts.'m
One possibility is that the appellate court apply the same standard of
favorability that the trial court applied, but refuse to reverse unless the
trial court's determination as to lack of favorability was clearly errone-
ous.2 23 The "clearly erroneous" standard would give the trial court
room for error on the often difficult and strategy-related question of
favorability of evidence. The problem with appellate review using a stan-
dard of favorability, however, is that even if the lower court was clearly
erroneous, nondisclosure of the favorable evidence could still be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.22 Reversal in such a situation, even given
the fact that the lower court clearly should have disclosed the informa-
tion, would effectuate Brady rights at an arguably unacceptable cost.'
In this case, however, the cost might be acceptable given the fact that it
would be the rare reversal in which evidence was so clearly favorable to
defendant that the trial court erred, and yet denial of access to such evi-
dence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The finality of judg-
ments would be substantially preserved.
A second possible standard for appellate review is that nondisclosure
pursuant to an in camera hearing is reversible error unless the nondisclo-
sure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, a consti-
tutional violation would occur whenever the court failed to disclose
favorable evidence, but the lower court's error would not be grounds for
reversal if it did not have a material effect on the defendant's ability to
prepare or to present a defense.226
222. See Rosenberg, supra note 142, at 637.
223. This seems to be the approach of appellate courts reviewing in camera determina-
tions under current practice. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 570, 577 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984); United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 775
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221, 1225-28 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
224. An example would be impeachment evidence as to a collateral witness, when evi-
dence of guilt was overwhelming. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340,
1345-46 (10th Cir. 1983).
225. Certainly the present Supreme Court assumes that reversal for harmless constitu-
tional error imposes an unacceptable cost on the judicial system. See Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-68 (1984); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509
(1983). But see Goldberg, Harmless Error Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L &
C. 421, 441 (1980) (should be no such thing as "harmless error" when it comes to consti-
tutional rights).
226. If the reviewing court reverses only when the undisclosed information is material,
the standard of review of the trial court's in camera ruling will not be in terms of whether
such ruling was clearly erroneous. The in camera review would have been based on
whether information is favorable, not whether it is material. Consequently, the reviewing
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This materiality standard of review has certain disadvantages. First,
the trial court's pre-trial standard-favorability-would differ from the
appellate court's post-trial standard-materiality. This is not a major
problem, however, in that the trial court would be constitutionally bound
to turn over evidence that is favorable, even if such evidence is not suffi-
ciently material to warrant reversal if withheld. There is no reason to
think that the trial court would (as opposed to the prosecutor) err toward
nondisclosure in reliance on the materiality standard of reversal. Apply-
ing different standards before and after trial is certainly preferable to the
current state of affairs under Agurs, in which an adversarial prosecutor
can refuse to disclose information that is favorable but not material, and
is accordingly insulated from reversal.22
A second possible problem with the materiality standard of review is
that it would resurrect the speculative "what might have been" analysis
adopted by Agurs.22 s Yet there are three consolations present with a ma-
teriality standard of review of an in camera determination that do not
exist under the Agurs review of a prosecutor's determination. First, un-
like the Agurs situation, there has already been an independent judicial
determination of favorability before trial. Second, unlike the Agurs situa-
tion, the reviewing court can apply a single standard of materiality be-
cause the nature of a defense request for evidence is not relevant to the
court's duty to disclose favorable evidence pursuant to an in camera re-
view.229 Third, to the extent that more information is disclosed before
and during trial by the objective court than by the advocate prosecu-
tor,230 the necessity to make such a speculative retrospective review of
nondisclosures will arise less frequently than under Agurs. Accordingly,
a materiality/harmless error standard of review for in camera errors as to
favorability seems the most appropriate balance of the defendant's right
court must review the undisclosed information independently, under a totally different
legal standard. Determining whether the trial court was clearly erroneous as to the
favorable nature of the information would be a useless task for the appellate court. Clear
error as to favorability would be irrelevant if the information is not material. Conversely,
it is difficult to imagine a case in which the undisclosed information is material, but in
which the trial court's determination that such information was not favorable to the de-
fendant would not constitute clear error.
227. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1309-11 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra
notes 113-14, 117 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
229. This is not to say that defense counsel would have no role as to the in camera
review. Defense counsel may be able in absentia to guide the court to favorable evidence
in the file by submission of an adversarial explanation of the case. See supra note 209. In
contrast to Agurs, however, this flagging function would not assume constitutional signifi-
cance in an in camera review. Defendant would not be penalized for defense counsel's
inability to guess at what may be in the prosecutor's file. Moreover, defense counsel's
input is less crucial because the court as an unbiased adjudicator would not have the same
bias problems that the prosecutor has in reviewing his file for evidence favorable to the
defense.
230. Greater disclosure currently appears to occur when an in camera hearing is held.
See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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of access to exculpatory evidence and the interest in preserving final
judgments.231
4. Nondisclosure of Evidence
The final aspect of the per se right to an in camera review that must be
addressed is the possibility of the prosecutor's failure to turn over infor-
mation in his custody to the court for an in camera inspection. The in
camera right guarantees an unbiased determination of favorability with
respect to evidence reviewed by the court. Thus, if the prosecutor turns
over a "thin" file, the in camera "solution" will be an ineffectual remedy
for the Brady right. To the extent that a thin file would result from af-
firmative bad faith efforts of the prosecutor to obstruct in camera review,
it must be stressed that the in camera solution is not designed to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, the in camera solution protects
against the far more prevalent problem of prosecutorial misjudgment of
the exculpatory nature of evidence contained in his file. As one commen-
tator has noted: "[S]uppression of favorable evidence rarely occurs be-
cause of a defect in prosecutorial integrity. Rather, suppression usually
results from the prosecutor's failure to appreciate the favorable aspects of
certain evidence. Once he decides to indict, the prosecutor becomes an
adversary whose perspective of the evidence is biased."" 2 Thus, the in
camera solution, like the Agurs system, rightfully relies on the integrity
and good faith of the prosecutor.233 The advantage of the in camera so-
lution, however, is that it avoids unwarranted reliance on the prosecu-
tor's ability to determine whether evidence is favorable to the accused.
If the assumption is correct that bad faith violations of Brady are ex-
tremely rare, the "thin" file problem will be commensurately rare. This
is because the good faith decision whether to put information in the file is
fundamentally different from the good faith decision whether informa-
tion in the fie is favorable to the defense. Whereas the former involves
the prosecutor as administrator/organizer/bookkeeper, the latter in-
volves the prosecutor as biased advocate. The mindset that results in
good faith nondisclosure under Agurs would not affect the filekeeping
decision. In fact, there would be no reason not to put all pertinent infor-
mation, including exculpatory information, in the file because the prose-
231. It should be noted that a defendant cannot immediately appeal a trial court's in
camera determination, because such an appeal can only be made from a final order. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); see also Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1057 (1984)
(district court's pre-trial disqualification of defense counsel was not final order); United
States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 264 (1982) (district court's interlocu-
tory order refusing to dismiss indictment was not final order).
232. Comment, Implementing Brady v. Maryland: An Argument for a Pretrial Open
File Policy, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 889, 896 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Open File]. See supra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
233. See United States v. Houston, 339 F. Supp. 762, 764-65 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 164 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Gillespie, 227
So. 2d 550, 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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cutor as advocate is unlikely to consider much if any evidence in his file
to be favorable to defendant's case at any rate.
It could be argued, however, that a per se right to an in camera hear-
ing may result in a thin file not because the prosecutor fails to file the
information, but because the prosecutor would have no incentive to in-
vestigate certain leads likely to result in discovery of exculpatory evi-
dence. Again assuming the integrity of the prosecutor, however, the in
camera solution presents little threat of substantial failures to investigate.
In most cases the prosecutorial arm of the government does not try to
discover exculpatory evidence; such evidence is uncovered in a search for
inculpatory evidence and then filed by a prosecutor acting in good faith.
It is fanciful to assume that investigations undertaken to inculpate a de-
fendant will be deterred by the government's concern over the possibility
that a court pursuant to in camera review will find that some of the infor-
mation uncovered is favorable to defendant.
It is true, though, that some investigations that are very likely to lead
to exculpatory evidence may not be undertaken and that certain evidence
may not be preserved. For example, in a rape case with sufficient eyewit-
nesses, the government may not take a sperm sample when it could only
hurt the prosecution's case, or the government may take such a sample
but destroy it without testing it. These problems occur today, however,
without the existence of the in camera threat: Cases have arisen in which
defendant alleges either that the government failed in a duty to prepare
information234 or failed in a corresponding duty to preserve evidence. 23 5
In response to such cases, strong arguments have been made that a duty
to investigate as well as to preserve all evidence that could be important
to the defense is a logical extension of Brady, and is necessary to guaran-
tee fully the constitutional right of access to exculpatory evidence.236
Whatever the merits of this contention,237 the fact remains that the good
234. See, e.g., United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 1984) (failure to
prepare interview report).
235. See, e.g., Johnston v. Pittman, 731 F.2d 1231, 1234 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to
preserve fluid samples of rape victim); Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir.
1983) (destruction of sperm sample in rape case); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,
644-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (failure to produce tape recording of defendant's conversation
with undercover agent) Mitchell v. State, 358 So. 2d 238, 240-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (failure to preserve tape recording of drug transaction), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. Corn v. Department of Legal Affairs, 368 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1979).
236. See generally Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investi-
gation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 835, 838 (1978) (must impose on state a
duty to investigate adequately all criminal cases in accordance with sixth amendment
rights and general notions of due process and fairness). See supra notes 234-35.
237. In California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that the constitutional right of "access to evidence" did not require the state
to preserve breath samples for drunken driving prosecutions, id. at 2535. Trombetta does
not, however, foreclose a prosecutorial duty of preservation or investigation. The Court
in fact implied that if the unpreserved (or uninvestigated) evidence could have been of
significant use to the defendant's case, the constitutional right of access to evidence would
have been violated. See id. at 2534; see also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
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faith of the government, as well as the inculpatory potential of most stan-
dard criminal investigations, will keep to a minimum the problem of
uninvestigated leads and the risk that prosecutors will fail to preserve
possibly favorable evidence. Adoption of an in camera solution will
neither exacerbate nor minimize the problem.
Nonetheless, it is inevitable that some information that would be
deemed favorable by the trial court in camera will not find its way into
the prosecutor's ifie, and thus will not be disclosed to defendant either
before or during trial. These situations will arise in one of three ways, all
of which present fairly limited problems: (1) bad faith suppression by the
prosecutor; (2) failure to investigate or to preserve evidence; or (3) failure
to collect in the file all information that can legitimately be held to be
within the prosecutor's custody, such as a federal Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration report favorable to a defendant being tried in state court." s
Presuming that the nondisclosure is discovered after trial, what standard
of reversal should apply?239
As is the case when the court errs in not disclosing favorable evidence
after its in camera review, 2" the prosecutor's error in not including in-
formation in the file is reviewable under two possible standards: First,
the court24 can automatically reverse whenever it determines that the
information not contained in the file would have been found favorable to
the defense after an in camera review. Alternatively, and more restric-
tively, the court could reverse if the evidence is favorable to the defend-
ant, unless the denial of access to such evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Again, the advantage of a "mere" favorability stan-
dard is in its equation of pre-trial obligation with post-trial standard of
review. But the disadvantage of the favorability standard is that reversal
858, 867 (1982) (when witness deported by government, defendant must show testimony
would have been material and favorable). Defendant in Trombetta could not satisfy this
materiality standard because the breath analysis test itself was reliable and there was no
showing that the breath sample could have attacked the integrity of the breathalyzer test.
Compare Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1983) (sperm samples im-
portant to defense and must be preserved) with Johnston v. Pittman, 731 F.2d 1231,
1234-35 (5th Cir. 1984) (in context of case, fluid samples from victim would not have
been reliable evidence).
238. As to the extent to which courts have held the prosecutor to be within construc-
tive possession of information, see Morgan v. Salamack, 735 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1984),
and the cases cited therein. Generally, courts hold the prosecutor to a standard of due
diligence. See id. at 359. This same standard would be applied under the in camera solu-
tion: All pertinent information that would be assembled by the duly diligent prosecutor
should be contained in the file and produced for in camera inspection. See supra note 207
and accompanying text.
239. Of course the chances of such nondisclosure being discovered are as slim as under
the Agurs system. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Under the in camera solu-
tion, however, at least the number of nondisclosures will be minimal. As noted, the in
camera solution remedies the main source of nondisclosure: the prosecutor's misjudg-
ments as to the favorability of evidence. See supra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
241. This will usually be an appellate court, but it could be a trial court if the evidence
is discovered in time for defendant to make a motion for a new trial.
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would be required in cases in which the re-trial would be basically dupli-
cative. This is arguably too high a cost for enforcing the defendant's
right of access to favorable evidence.242 The materiality/harmless error
standard, although not without problems in terms of speculative review
and prosecutorial gamesmanship, 243 will arguably balance the interest in
access to evidence with the interest in finality of judgments.24
Nonetheless, the case for automatic reversal whenever the prosecutor
errs in failing to include favorable evidence in the file has further merit:
It will encourage prosecutors to live up to their Brady duties. The in
camera solution takes from the prosecutor's shoulders the onerous bur-
den of determining favorability. The remaining administrative responsi-
bility to include pertinent information in the file is far less burdensome
and should arguably be strictly enforced. If the duty to maintain a com-
plete file were not strictly enforced, prosecutors would have no incentive
to cooperate with the court's in camera review. This is because inclusion
of favorable evidence in the file does not help his case and exclusion of
such evidence does not hurt his case unless the evidence is later discov-
ered and is determined to be material, not just favorable.245
Assuming that such deviousness does not reflect the thoughts of the
vast majority of prosecutors acting in good faith, the fact remains that
the prosecutor acting in bad faith would have every opportunity to ex-
ploit the materiality standard, thereby vitiating the defendant's right of
access to favorable evidence. Although bad faith suppressions exist in
today's world of limited and happenstance disclosures under Agurs,246
the same behavior would be rightly regarded as very glaring examples of
prosecutorial misconduct when the determination of favorability is no
longer the prosecutor's responsibility. Thus, even assuming that auto-
matic reversal would present too great a cost if mandated for every case
of a prosecutor's failure to include favorable information in the file, it
may not be too great a cost if defendant can show that the prosecutor's
failure was an act of bad faith.247 Accordingly, an appropriate and effec-
tive standard of review for prosecutorial failure to submit information for
242. See supra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 117, 222-31 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
245. This is a defect in the Agurs system with respect to the far broader problem of
prosecutorial determination of the favorability of evidence. Agurs' materiality standards
give prosecutors no incentive to comply with Brady. Beatty, supra note 29, at 238; Com-
ment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 480, 491-92 [here-
inafter cited as Duty Reconsidered]; see United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d
Cir. 1984) (court decries prosecutorial "gamesmanship").
246. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Note, The Prosecutor's
Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence in the Absence of a Focused Request
From the Defendant, 14 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 319, 330-34 (1976); Duty Reconsidered, supra
note 245, at 492.
247. Pre-Agurs courts had required virtually automatic reversal if the prosecutor sup-
pressed favorable evidence in bad faith. See, e.g., United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138,
146-47 (2d Cir. 1968); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1961); see
generally Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs, 1977 U.
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in camera inspection is as follows: Reversal is required if the prosecu-
tor's failure is in bad faith and the information would have been disclosed
by the trial court as favorable to the preparation or presentation of the
defense; if the prosecutor's error cannot be proven to be an act of bad
faith, reversal is required if the information would have been disclosed by
the trial court, unless the denial of access was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt to the preparation or presentation of the defense.
If automatic reversal for suppression of favorable but not material evi-
dence is considered too high a cost for even bad faith prosecutorial er-
rors,248 the harmless error standard could be applied to all cases in which
the prosecutor fails to include favorable evidence in the file. It would
then be the duty of the courts to protect against any bad faith acts of the
prosecutor-infrequent though they may be-by imposing sanctions
other than reversal for such misconduct, such as publication of the prose-
cutor's name or referral for disciplinary action. 24 9
Post-trial review of nondisclosures after in camera hearings, whether
due to error by the prosecutor or the court, is undeniably difficult. The
great solace, however, is that an in camera hearing will guarantee that
such post-trial reviews will be far less frequent than under Agurs. -  By
eliminating the problem of prosecutorial incapability of determining
whether evidence is favorable to the defendant, and by adopting a pre-
trial disclosure standard of favorability, not materiality, the in camera
solution assures that defendants will have much less about which to com-
plain on appeal.
D. Objections to a Per Se Right to an In Camera Hearing
A per se right to an in camera review of the prosecutor's file has never
been adopted as a means to effectuate the defendant's constitutional right
of access to exculpatory evidence.251 Five arguments have generally been
Ill. L.F. 690, 700-04 (advocating standard of reversal if relevant information suppressed
in bad faith) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure].
248. Courts have not been prone to adopt a rule of automatic reversal for bad faith
errors by the prosecutor. See, eg., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1181-82 (2d
Cir. 1981) (substantial prejudice required for reversal when prosecutor made improper
remarks in summation), cert denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); People v. Galloway, 54
N.Y.2d 396, 401, 430 N.E.2d 885, 887-88, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11-12 (1981) (defendant not
substantially prejudiced by boisterous behavior of attorneys during trial). In rejecting a
rule of automatic reversal, the court in Modica stated: "Reversal is an ill-suited remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct; it does not affect the prosecutor directly, but rather im-
poses upon society the cost of retrying an individual who was fairly convicted." 663 F.2d
at 1184. See generally Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges,
50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 644-47 (1972) (reviewing uses and limitations of appellate reversal).
249. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185-86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982).
250. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
251. The Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969), came close to adopting a per se in camera hearing require-
ment, noting that it would solve the problems of reliance on the benevolence of the
prosecutor on the one hand, and the potential for abuse of an open file rule on the other.
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advanced against an in camera solution to the problems of access posed
by Agurs. Although some of the arguments are of substance, none really
comes to grips with the significance of the rights guaranteed by Brady
and the inadequacy of the Agurs system in effectuating those rights. The
objections to the in camera solution can be adequately answered when
viewed in that context.
1. The Trial Court is in No Position to Determine the Favorability
of Evidence at an In Camera Hearing
In United States v. Cobb,z52 the court expressed a view representative
of many authorities253 that an in camera examination "offers no real so-
lution" to the Brady problem "for the reason that the Court may be less
knowledgeable than the parties, particularly in criminal proceedings
presenting complicated issues.''254 There are several responses to this
objection.
First, even a judge who knows only the general outlines of a case is
likely to determine reliably and objectively whether information in the
prosecutor's file is favorable or relevant to a logical defense to the charge.
When compared to the Agurs system, in which the knowledgeable but
biased prosecutor is expected to determine which evidence is favorable to
the opponent, a substantial argument can be made that a less informed
but more objective viewpoint would result in greater access by the de-
See id. at 800-01. The Fifth Circuit subsequently retreated from the broad language in
Williams. See United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir.) (Williams in camera
procedure merely a "suggestion"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972). Under current Fifth
Circuit practice, as well as elsewhere, defendant is entitled to an in camera hearing (other
than by the grace of the prosecutor) only when he can make a preliminary showing of
materiality, only as to specific evidence, not the entire file, and only if the prosecutor does
not deny the existence of favorable evidence. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying
text.
Reviewing courts have occasionally chided lower courts for refusing to hold an in cam-
era inspection, on the ground that such an inspection would have obviated the need for
speculative post-trial review. See, e.g., United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607, 613-14 (5th
Cir. 1979) (reversible error when trial court failed to conduct in camera review of docu-
ments specifically requested by defendant). Yet these suggestions from appellate courts
clearly do not amount to a per se right to in camera inspection.
252. 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
253. See, e.g., Open File, supra note 232, at 903-04 (discussing defects in judicial exami-
nation of evidence); Disclosure, supra note 247, at 711 (discussing who should decide if
evidence is exculpatory); Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 130, at 148 (same).
254. United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court relied
on dictum from Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court stated that grand jury minutes could not be effectively reviewed by an in camera
examination because "[t]he determination of what may be useful to the defense can prop-
erly and effectively be made only by an advocate." Ironically, however, this dictum, taken
in context, appears to lean toward the dreaded open file rule, as opposed to prosecutorial
discretion, for grand jury minutes. See Dennis, 384 U.S. at 875. The point of the in cam-
era solution is that, although not without problems, it is more palatable than the open file
rule, which courts believe will lead to abuses. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text.
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fendant to exculpatory evidence.255
Secondly, a trial court is not without aid in determining favorability.
Especially in complex cases, adversary submissions by the prosecutor
and defense counsel can and will inform the court of the nature of the
case and of the type of evidence that would be favorable to the defense.35 6
Also, when the trial court calls its doubts in favor of the defendant, the
prosecutor, on objection, can inform the court of circumstances it may
have overlooked that indicate that the information about to be disclosed
is not in fact favorable.257
Of course the relevance and favorability of information in the prosecu-
tor's file may not become apparent to an objective decisionmaker, indeed
to anyone, until the trial unfolds.25 ' Prior convictions of a witness, for
instance, do not become relevant unless the prosecution calls that witness
or his statement is admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule." Q
Yet the in camera solution is not limited to a "one shot" pre-trial deter-
mination of favorability any more than the Agurs system allows the pros-
ecutor to review his fie only once.2 I As already noted,26' the in camera
solution, in order to be fully effective, requires a continuing duty to re-
view information in the prosecutor's file and to disclose such information
once its favorability becomes apparent.2 62 Consequently, the argument
that the trial court is ill-suited to determine favorability is unconvincing,
especially when it is noted that as the trial proceeds, the court becomes
familiar with the evidence.2 63 Moreover, the court's effectiveness in de-
255. The same empirical proposition underlies the warrant requirement. Even though
the police officer is obviously more familiar with the defendant's activity, the objective
determination of the magistrate is considered more reliable and more protective of consti-
tutional interests in privacy. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (1983). See
supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. The court in United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) posited that the effectiveness of an in camera
inspection would be increased substantially after adversary submissions. See id. at 885.
This option is viable in light of the fact that such submissions need not be disclosed to the
opposing party.
257. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
258. See United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
259. If a hearsay declarant has prior convictions, defendant may be able to impeach
the veracity of that declarant under Federal Rule of Evidence 806. See Fed. R. Evid. 806.
260. See, e.g, United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 1979) (prose-
cutor has continuing obligation under Brady to produce "at the appropriate time" excul-
patory evidence requested).
261. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
262. Continuance or other devices may be required to assure that the information can
still be used by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1339
(11th Cir. 1982) (witness re-called to allow use of impeachment information), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 3542 (1983). See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
263. It is possible that during the trial the trial judge may fail to remember that certain
information, which now would be deemed favorable, is contained in the prosecutor's file.
This problem can be alleviated somewhat by defense requests and by the trial court's
discretion to order re-inspection of the file. Alternatively, the trial court could obtain a
copy of the prosecutor's file, for reference purposes as the trial progresses. See supra
notes 219-21.
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termining favorability is particularly apparent when viewed in compari-
son with the problems that result when the issue of favorability is in the
hands of the prosecutor or the defense counsel.
2. Access to the Prosecutor's File Will Prejudice the Trial Court
Against the Defendant
The court in State v. Gillespie264 states a representative view 265 of the
alleged dangers of prejudice to the defendant that can arise with an in
camera inspection:
[I]t is not unreasonable to expect, indeed it is likely, that a prosecutor's
files will contain information concerning an accused which is ex-
tremely prejudicial or inflammatory, yet probably inadmissible at trial;
e.g., the past criminal record of the accused, or his ill repute among
law enforcement agencies. Knowledge of these matters on the part of
the trial judge could seriously impair, however unintentionally, judicial
impartiality.2 66
This argument not only underestimates the capacity and integrity of
trial judges; it also ignores the fact that judges routinely consider evi-
dence that is prejudicial to the defendant, and in fact exclude such evi-
dence, without presumed impairment of their impartiality.267 The fact
that evidence in the prosecutor's file may be ruled inadmissible does not
mean that the judge will never hear about it. It is the judge who will rule
on admissibility when the vast majority of such evidence is inevitably
proffered by the prosecution.268 In fact, in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in nonjury trials, prejudice
is not an appropriate consideration, because it is presumed that the
judge-unlike the jury-can keep prejudice from his mind in considering
the evidence.269
Moreover, the prejudice shibboleth is already applicable to the more
limited (in both extent and occurrence) in camera inspections that trial
264. 227 So. 2d 550, 557-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
265. See, e.g., Open File, supra note 232, at 903; Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 130, at
148-49.
266. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 557-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). This argu-
ment will of course not apply if the task of conducting an in camera inspection is dele-
gated to a magistrate.
267. See Fed. R. Evid. 104, 403, 404(b); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence 403[03], at 403-18 to -36 (1983); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, 404[18], at
404-99 to -113; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, 609[03], at 609-60 to -69.
268. The prosecutor would indeed be remiss as an advocate if he did not try to get
damaging and even prejudicial evidence admitted. For example, defendant's prior crimi-
nal acts, while undoubtedly prejudicial, are more often than not probative to another
issue in the case, such as motive or intent, and thus are at least arguably admissible under
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); 2 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, supra note 267, 404[11 I-[18], at 404-66 to -113. Because the argument as to
admissibility will be before the trial judge, pre-trial in camera access to such information
in the prosecutor's file creates no greater danger of trial court prejudice than that with
which we live today.
269. See Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 53
ACCESS TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
courts currently undertake under Brady. Yet courts have uniformly re-
jected the notion that access to prejudicial evidence during in camera
review would impermissibly affect the trial judge."" This is a salutary
result, because the harm from the judge's access to prejudicial informa-
tion, if any, is far outweighed by the benefits reaped by defendant
through the in camera device.271
3. Trial Court Access to the State's Evidence Will Create Chain of
Custody Problems
In State v. Gillespie,272 the court argued that a pitfall of the in camera
hearing requirement is that "if the trial judge were to examine certain
evidence he, himself, could become a link in the chain of possession
thereof. The undoing of this circumstance, if it were to become necessary
as well it might, could surely tax the bounds of discretionary procedural
ingenuity."27 3 Contrary to the assertion in Gillespie, however, chain of
custody problems would be minimal, if not nonexistent, if the in camera
solution were adopted.
The prosecution must establish a chain of custody for all real evidence
that it seeks to admit as an exhibit at trial, in order to prevent an infer-
ence that such exhibits have been tampered with or changed in some
regard.274 Because the chain of custody requirement applies only to real
evidence-as opposed to such evidence as witness' statements, lab and
police reports and prior convictions of witnesses-a judge's review of the
270. See United States v. Johnson, 658 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1981); see also
United States v. Sonderup, 639 F.2d 294, 296-97 (5th Cir.) (judge not prejudiced by evi-
dence from pre-trial motions and bond hearings), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
271. In Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969), the Court addressed the propriety
of a trial judge's access to a pre-sentence report before a verdict had been rendered, see id.
at 492. The Court noted that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 prohibited such
access and held that "the rule must not be taken lightly" because "[t]o permit the exparte
introduction of this sort of material to the judge who will pronounce the defendant's guilt
or innocence or who will preside over a jury trial would seriously contravene the rule's
purpose of preventing possible prejudice from premature submission of the presentence
report." Id. at 492 (emphasis added). But see United States v. Bunch, 730 F.2d 517, 519
(7th Cir. 1984) (judge need not recuse himself because of premature access to pre-sen-
tence report). Pre-verdict access to a pre-sentence report differs from an in camera re-
view of the prosecutor's file in one important respect: It serves no useful function, and
does not benefit defendant in any way, for the judge to have access to a pre-sentence
report before a verdict is rendered. The Supreme Court implicitly stated this in Gregg by
referring to "premature" submission of the pre-sentence report. In contrast, when the
judge reviews the prosecutor's file in camera, he performs an important, constitutionally-
based function, which far outweighs any prejudice that may occur. The judge's in camera
inspection is thus more akin to in limine rulings on evidence (an important function,
albeit with access to prejudicial information) than it is to a premature access to a pre-
sentence report. See supra notes 267-70.
272. 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
273. Id. at 558.
274. See United States v. Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65-66 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally
Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 Am. Crim. L Rev.
527, 535-45 (1983) (discussing appropriate circumstances and time periods for chain of
custody).
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prosecutor's file will not present a chain of custody problem with respect
to the vast majority of information contained therein. Moreover, if the
judge's in camera access to real evidence does present a chain of custody
problem, it can easily be resolved by the prosecutor placing in the file a
description of the real evidence he intends to use at trial.27 - A prosecu-
tor's description of such evidence presents little risk of abuse of Brady
principles, because if the prosecutor is going to admit it at trial, it is safe
to assume that the evidence is not favorable to defendant. Although the
prosecutor is too much of an advocate to know what information is
favorable to defendant, he is sufficiently an advocate to know that evi-
dence he will use at trial is not favorable to the defense.
Even assuming that the trial judge unavoidably becomes a link in the
chain of custody during an in camera inspection, it is axiomatic that a
gap in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility.2 76 It is inconceivable that the trial judge's possession of
real evidence during in camera inspection would detract from the weight
of such evidence.2 77 Accordingly, objections to the in camera solution
grounded in the trial court's custody of real evidence are weak at best.
4. Brady Applies Only When Exculpatory Evidence Is Suppressed by
the Prosecutor and Discovered After Trial
In United States v. Agurs,2 78 the Court described Brady as involving
"discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the pros-
ecution but unknown to the defense., 279 Some Courts have accordingly
viewed Brady as being simply irrelevant to discovery before or during the
trial. In United States v. Zive,28° for instance, the court stated flatly:
"Brady v. Maryland did not deal in any way with pretrial discovery by a
defendant nor with any duty of the court in that respect. On the con-
trary, the discussion was of the duty of the prosecutor, wholly apart from
any order of the court.I281 Likewise, in United States v. Moore,282 the
275. All other real evidence, if any, could be inspected by the judge in camera without
a chain of custody problem, because the chain of custody requirement deals with actual
use of real evidence at trial. See United States v. Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65 (7th Cir.
1980).
276. See United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Henderson, 588 F.2d 157, 160
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); Giannelli, supra note 274, at 546.
277. It is important to note that when chain of custody objections have been sustained
by courts, the gaps in the chain have occurred within the prosecutorial arm of the govern-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 935 (1966), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Arciniega, 574 F.2d 931
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908 (1978); Smith v. United States, 157 F.2d 705, 705-06
(D.C. Cir. 1946). The inference of tampering is obviously much greater when the cus-
tody questions arise within the prosecutorial arm of the government than when an unbi-
ased judge has possession of the evidence.
278. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
279. Id. at 103.
280. 299 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
281. Id. at 1274.
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court stated that "Brady did not deal with pretrial discovery. It con-
cerned only prosecutorial suppression of evidence known to be crucial to
the defense. . . . Brady was never intended to create pretrial
remedies. 283
If the above propositions are valid, a per se right of in camera review
would receive no support from Brady, and may indeed be considered
constitutionally impermissible. The in camera solution would amount to
effectuating a right that has not even come into existence at the time of
the in camera inspection, because the right would not exist until after the
trial in which the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence through-
out the trial.28 4
The proposition that the Brady right arises only after trial reflects a
misunderstanding of the case. Brady established the right of access to
favorable evidence as part of the fundamental right to a fair trial.2 5
Brady, and especially Agurs, established a method by which to effectuate
that right of access: the remedy of post-trial reversal if it is found that
defendant is denied access. Neither Brady nor Agurs, however, purports
to promulgate an exclusive constitutional remedy for denial of the right
of access to exculpatory evidence. Nor do Brady or Agurs purport to rule
out alternative methods of effectuating the right, particularly if such
methods will result in higher protection of the fundamental right of ac-
cess to evidence.28 6 Cases holding that Brady guarantees only a post-trial
right are thus incorrect. Instead, Brady guarantees a right of access both
before and at trial, by establishing a nonexclusive post-trial remedy.2
Of course, Brady and Agurs both focused on the prosecutor's duty to
disclose, which does not especially suggest that a trial court would have a
282. 439 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1971).
283. Id. at 1108 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 911
(6th Cir.) ("Brady holds only that the suppression at trial of evidence favorable to an
accused is a denial of due process."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); United States v.
Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1019 (D.N.J. 1968) ("[A]ppropriate remedial processes are
available [under Brady] to correct possible abuse arising out of the suppression of excul-
patory material."), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Brady did not intend to create
pre-trial remedies.).
284. See State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1969) (relying on
Brady rights for pre-trial discovery "is akin, it may be said, to one yelling 'Ouch!', before
he's hurt.").
285. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
286. To the contrary, the Court in Agurs recognized that in camera review would have
at least some utility in effectuating defendant's right of access. See United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
287. Whether favorable information must be disclosed before or at trial under Brady
(and under the in camera solution) will depend on the nature of the evidence and a bal-
ancing of prosecutorial interests. See, eg., United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580 (3d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 825 (1970). Nonetheless, the Brady right is a right of access to evidence in time for
it to be of use to the defense. See supra note 82.
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pre-trial role in guaranteeing access to favorable evidence. 28 8 Zive and
Moore specifically rely on Brady's focus on the prosecutor's duty.289
Again, however, this misses the point of Brady. It imposed a constitu-
tional duty on the prosecutor, but neither it nor Agurs purported to
adopt an exclusive method for effectuating that duty; neither decision
prohibits adoption of an alternative, more effective method of allowing
the prosecutor to satisfy his duty. 90 The in camera solution enforces the
prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure established by Brady, and
does so without imposing on the prosecutor the virtually impossible task
of having to determine whether evidence is favorable to his adversary:
The prosecutor discharges his Brady duty merely by keeping a complete
file and turning it over to the court. Because the in camera solution is
thus a more effective and less burdensome means of enforcing the prose-
cutor's Brady duty, it is hardly foreclosed by Brady or Agurs.
Courts that read Brady as requiring that the prosecutor's duty to dis-
close be discharged without interference by the court or anyone else are
basically emphasizing prosecutorial prerogative, not prosecutorial duty.
Yet Brady and Agurs, in providing one solution for enforcement of the
duty to disclose, did not intend to grant to the prosecutor the privilege of
sole dominion over exculpatory evidence. Brady, in imposing a duty on
the prosecutor, did not thereby make him a despot. As the Third Circuit
recently stated in United States v. Starusko: "We flatly reject the notion,
espoused by the prosecution, that 'it is the government, not the district
court, that in the first instance is to decide when to turn over Brady ma-
terial.' . . . Today, we affirm this Court's long-standing policy and ap-
plaud the district court's effort to ensure prompt compliance with
Brady. ' 29
1
Accordingly, because neither Agurs nor Brady precludes more effective
means of guaranteeing defendant's right of access to exculpatory evi-
dence or more efficient means of enforcing the prosecutor's correspond-
ing duty of disclosure, the in camera solution withstands a misreading of
Brady as establishing a solely post-trial right.
288. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (prosecutor violated constitutional duty to disclose only when
omission denies defendant a fair trial).
289. See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
290. Again, the Court in Agurs envisioned at least limited use of an in camera inspec-
tion to aid the prosecutor in effectuating his duty of disclosure. See United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
291. 729 F.2d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 1984). Many courts have held that Brady rights are
implicated before and during trial and that the trial court has the obligation both before
and during the trial to enforce the prosecutor's duty of disclosure and defendant's corre-
sponding right of access to favorable evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d
1453, 1470 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D.
Ga. 1972); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State ex
rel. Dooley v. Connall, 257 Or. 94, 102, 475 P.2d 582, 586 (1970).
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5. The In Camera Solution Will Impose an Intolerable Burden on the
Trial Court
The strongest objection to the in camera solution has been saved for
last. Undoubtedly, a per se right to an in camera review of the prosecu-
tor's file would impose an extreme burden on the trial court, particularly
in complex cases. A typical reaction to the task of in camera review is the
response of the trial court judge in United States v. Navarro292 to defend-
ant's request for an in camera inspection under Brady: "Look, I am not
going to conduct a trial within a trial here. . . . [The file] looks like it is
about three inches thick, and I am not going to read it. I am going to
accept the representation of Government counsel."' 93 Dark predictions
of the undue burdens that an in camera solution would impose have been
voiced by courts2 94 and commentators. 295 Even if the task of an in cam-
era inspection could be delegated to magistrates, the burden on the crimi-
nal justice system would be substantial if every criminal defendant had
an absolute right to demand in camera inspection before trial.
The response to the undue burdens objection is two-fold. First, the
actual burdens of an in camera solution, when compared with the bur-
dens imposed by the current Agurs system, may not be so great. In es-
sence, Agurs results in expenditure of judicial resources at the appellate
level, in the form of retrospective review under unnecessarily compli-
cated materiality standards. 96 These appellate costs may not be as great
under the in camera solution, given the fact that an objective pre-trial
determination of favorability will result in greater disclosure to defend-
ants.297 Furthermore, trial courts are not free from burdens under the
current Agurs system. If the suppression is not discovered until after trial
and the suppressed evidence is held in retrospect to be material, substan-
tial costs arise because of the necessity to re-try the case. 98 Another cost
292. 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. CL 438 (1984).
293. Id. at 629 n.5.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir.) ("undue burden
on the district court"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 438 (1984); United States v. Cobb, 271 F.
Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("pretrial fishing expedition"); State v. Gillespie, 227
So. 2d 550, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ("ponderous, time-consuming task if utilized
in every case merely on demand").
295. See supra note 253.
296. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
297. That the in camera solution will result in more disclosures is, of course, an empiri-
cal proposition. Evidence to support this proposition, however, can be found in the cur-
rent, limited use of in camera hearings, in which the court orders disclosure and the
prosecutor objects that the information is not Brady material. See, e.g., United States v.
Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1470 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 43 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. CL 725 (1984). Such disclosure would clearly not occur if
the prosecutor were the sole arbiter of favorablility. Moreover, even if the in camera
solution does not totally prevent post-trial review, such review will at least be less com-
plex than that required by Agurs. An appellate court could review the in camera ruling
by a single standard, as opposed to the Agurs pigeonholes. See supra notes 163, 229 and
accompanying text.
298. See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL granted, 105 S.
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occurs when the appellate court finds it necessary to remand to the trial
court for an in camera hearing as to whether certain suppressed informa-
tion in the prosecutor's file is in fact material, in which case reversal for
such suppression would be required.29 9 All this contretemps would be
avoided if an in camera hearing were conducted before trial as a matter
of course. A final cost of the Agurs system that cannot be ignored is that
if the suppression of material evidence is not discovered until after trial,
the passage of time may make re-trial impossible.3°°
All the above costs of the Agurs system occur because favorability of
evidence is determined by the prosecutor, and thus exculpatory evidence
is often not discovered until after trial, if at all. To the extent that an
objective determination by the court or magistrate will result in more
reliable findings of favorability, and thus increased disclosure before or at
trial,301 the in camera solution is in fact cost-effective in comparison to
the Agurs system.
Nevertheless, the in camera solution does on balance raise a greater
specter of substantial expenditure of resources than does the Agurs sys-
tem.30 2 More judges and magistrates would undoubtedly have to be
hired. The question then becomes whether it is too expensive to provide
more effective guarantees of the constitutional right of access to favorable
evidence. It can be argued, of course, that if the right of access to excul-
patory evidence is so fundamental as to be constitutionalized, no expense
can be too great to ensure that the right is not merely an empty promise.
Arguably, the drafters of the Bill of Rights have already factored in the
cost of the right as well as the cost of an effective remedy, and have found
Ct. 427 (1984); Sennett v. Sheriff of Fairfax County, 608 F.2d 537, 538 (4th Cir. 1979);
People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 442, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 1074, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 106
(1979).
299. See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
300. See Anderson v. South Carolina, 542 F. Supp. 725, 738 (D.S.C. 1982), afid, 709
F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1983).
301. See supra note 297.
302. Note that as far as cost is concerned, the in camera solution would not necessarily
be applicable to a defendant who pleads guilty. The constitutional issue for a defendant
who pleads guilty is whether defendant has made a voluntary choice and gets that for
which he bargained. Fambo v. Smith, 565 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1977). Moreover, the
right to prepare an effective defense, which is the heart of Brady, by definition does not
apply to one who voluntarily chooses not to assert a defense. Accordingly, most courts
have held that Brady does not apply to the decision to plead guilty. See, e.g., Fambo v.
Smith, 565 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205,
1211 (W.D. Pa. 1979). Because the in camera solution is merely a more efficient method
to protect the rights guaranteed by Brady, it follows that an in camera hearing would not
be required if defendant pleads guilty well before trial. But see Ex parte Lewis, 587
S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (prosecutor has Brady obligation to one who
pleads guilty).
It should also be noted that the time taken in conducting an in camera hearing would
be "excusable" delay, and thus would not give rise to speedy trial claims. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1982); Amsterdam, Speedy
Criminal Trials: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525, 530-31 (1975).
446 [Vol. 53
ACCESS TO EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
such costs to be worthwhile; it can be said that the drafters have done all
the balancing of costs and benefits that is necessary.
30 3
Reliance on the cost-benefit conclusions of the drafters, however, is not
currently in vogue in the Burger Court. The Court has felt free to engage
in its own cost-benefit analysis in determining whether a right and rem-
edy must be enforced. Even if the right is a fundamental one, the Court
has felt free to determine whether the suggested remedy for such a right
is in fact cost-effective. 3° The propriety of the use of a cost-benefit anal-
ysis to determine the extent of enforcement of fundamental rights has
often been debated, particularly as to the exclusionary rule, and need not
be recapitulated here.305 It suffices to note that if potentially greater ex-
pense is the only valid argument against an in camera solution, the dis-
cussion of the vitality of the proposal should not end there.
Even presuming that a cost-benefit analysis is warranted, two proposi-
tions seem unassailable: The constitutional right of access guaranteed by
Brady is a fundamental right, which is and must be highly valued, and
thus the benefits resulting from effective enforcement of the right are
high, and the Agurs system provides inadequate and haphazard enforce-
ment of the fundamental Brady right and results in significant costs to
the justice system as well. Given this state of affairs, alternative methods
of effectuating the constitutional right provided by Brady must at least
be given some consideration.30 6 This is particularly so if the alternative
remedy relieves the justice system and the litigants of the unacceptable
burdens imposed by Agurs: The prosecutor is freed from his impossible
role of determining the favorability of evidence to his adversary, defense
counsel is freed from his impossible role of guessing what might be in the
prosecutor's file, and the reviewing court is freed from its impossible role
303. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 645-49
(1983).
304. Examples of the Court's current focus on costs to the justice system incurred by
enforcing constitutional rights include: United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413-16
(1984) (enforcement of fourth amendment rights through undifferentiated exclusionary
rule not cost effective); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (cost of re-trial on wit-
nesses, system and victims); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (Court focuses on
costs in denying right to counsel when no imprisonment results); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 492-95 (1976) (societal costs of application of exclusionary rule).
305. See the opinions in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), and the com-
mentaries cited therein.
306. The Burger Court has been only too happy to consider alternative methods of
enforcement of fourth amendment rights. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 3422-23 (1984) (allowing reviewing courts to exercise informed discretion in ruling
on fourth amendment questions); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
420-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing "the suppression doctrine as an
anomalous and ineffective mechanism with which to regulate law enforcement"). The in
camera solution in fact derives some support from the Supreme Court's recent attacks on
the exclusionary rule, which are based on the proposition that the rule is not only costly
but ineffective in protecting fourth amendment rights. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413. Like-
wise, the Agurs system is open to legitimate attack on the grounds that it is quite costly
and yet ineffective in protecting Brady rights.
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of determining the effect of evidence that was not in fact used at trial.
Also to be considered is the fact that the in camera device is already in
limited use and results in greater disclosure to defendants.3"7 Thus, given
the inadequacy and costliness of the Agurs system and the logical and
empirical basis of the in camera solution, even a Supreme Court con-
cerned with costs must consider the possibility of a per se right to in
camera inspection. At the very least, a pilot program should be insti-
tuted so that a more reasoned cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken.
Undifferentiated fear of the cost of the in camera solution is an invalid
basis of objection, especially in light of the inadequacies of Agurs.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Brady established a constitutional right of ac-
cess to favorable evidence, but the Court has not provided an effective
system for guaranteeing enjoyment of the right. Because the Court's cur-
rent system results in unreliable and biased determinations of the central
issue of favorability, Brady rights will generally depend on the luck of the
defendant. Even if the defendant is fortunate enough to discover the
existence of exculpatory evidence, this discovery may occur after trial, at
which time the defendant's right of access must be evaluated specula-
tively and balanced against the interest in finality of judgments.
A per se right to an in camera hearing is a better and fairer method of
guaranteeing enjoyment of Brady rights. The solution guarantees that in-
formation held by the prosecutor will be reliably reviewed, and that ob-
jectively favorable evidence will be disclosed to defendant, as required by
Brady. The drawback of this solution is its cost. Yet more must be done
to determine whether an in camera solution provides benefits that far
outweigh the costs. The in camera solution deserves honest considera-
tion; otherwise, we will remain unconscionably content with second-class
enforcement of first-class rights.
307. See supra note 297.
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